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The researcher applied a mixed methods approach to conduct a cross-sectional 
assessment of the safety culture, safety climate, and SMS at a regional airline in 
the United States. Data collection techniques were comprised of interview, 
online-survey, and a focus group activity. Participants in the current study were 
maintenance technicians, flight attendants, dispatchers, pilots, and managers. 
Results indicated significant differences of perception of safety climate, safety 
culture, and Safety Management System between the maintenance technicians 
and flight attendants. The length of time a participant had worked at the subject 
airline and age of the participant appeared to be significant factors of perception 
of safety climate. The ASAP safety program appeared to be the most positively 
perceived safety program across all the studied groups. Participants expressed a 
general positive outlook of safety at the subject airline. Elements of concern 
highlighted included routine violation and senior management being out of touch 
















CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study was to assess the safety climate and safety 
culture at a regional airline in the United States (U.S). Employee perception of 
the subject airline’s safety climate, as well as that of the five elements of a 
positive safety culture (Reason, 1997) were assessed. Elements of safety climate 
assessed in the current study are three of the most identified by researchers 
(Dedobbeleer & Béland, 1991; Flint et al., 2000; Patankar et al., 2012; Seo et al., 
2004; Zohar, 2000). Additionally, the employee perception of the four pillars of 
Safety Management System (SMS) (International Civil Aviation Organization 
[ICAO], 2013), were evaluated. Participants of the study were front-line 
employees and management of the subject airlines. The two groups are critical to 
airline operational safety (Taylor, 2012). The front-line participants were from the 
groups Pilots, Flight attendant, Dispatch, and Maintenance. This study used a 
mixed-method (Creswell, 2009) approach as well as a cross-sectional design 
(Wreathall, 1995). 
Safety is an integral element of the aviation industry. Like many industries, 
the aviation industry has inherent risks that need to be regularly identified and 
managed to improve operational safety. Identifying risk is among the key steps to 






interpreted can hamper efforts to monitor and improve safety. In addition, a 
robust safety system is essential to the effective management of safety (Macrae, 
2009).The historical method of assessing safety has been primarily through 
observing and measuring the rate of accidents and/or incidents (Liou et al., 2008). 
Gerede (2014) considers this approach objective and practical, but also ‘reactive’ 
(p. 1) as safety is assessed after occurrences of unsafe events. Nevertheless, it 
is no longer logical to manage safety reactively due to relatively lower rate of 
accidents (Liou et al., 2008; Wood, 2003). Additionally, the traditional approach 
to management of safety fails to adequately address other diverse operational 
safety elements. Liou et al. (2008) identified other aspects of safety as such as 
human and organizational factors; operators; aviation regulators; aviation service 
providers; and organizational culture. These factors may contribute to latent 
unsafe conditions that might be difficult to forecast using historical safety 
assessment practices (Liou et al., 2008).   
The Safety Management System (SMS) is a performance-based and risk-
based approach to managing safety. SMS addresses some of the deficiencies 
inherent in the historical style of evaluating safety performance by taking a top-
down approach and robust commitment to safety in an organization (Lewis, 
2008). SMS functions on the premise that safety is achieved by cultivating a 
positive safety culture that runs through all levels of an organization (Chen & 
Chen, 2011; Gill & Shergill, 2004; Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008). Culture 
influences perceptions of safety programs. Actions and behaviors of individuals, 






concerning decisions they have to make (International Aviation Transport 
Association [IATA], 2011; Lewis, 2008).  
Positive safety culture is characterized by elements such as learning, 
reporting, informed, flexible, and just cultures (International Association of Oil & 
Gas Producers, 2013; Reason, 1997). Of these, reporting culture is integral to a 
proactive and predictive safety initiative as it facilitates the availability of data. 
Data is critical to identify latent failures that can be mitigated to improve safety. 
Then again, reporting culture is dependent upon a sound just culture. A just 
culture is one in which trust thrives that encourages members of an organization 
or community to provide information about safety incidents without fear of unjust 
persecution. It provides a blame-free atmosphere conducive for genuine dialogue 
and room to learn from safety related reporting.    
Assessing employee perceptions towards an organization’s safety practices, 
policies, and procedures can best reflect an individual’s likely intentions and 
behavior (Gerede, 2014; Taylor, 2012). Intentions and behavior may include 
safety reporting and adherence to established policies, practice, and procedures. 
The collective perceptions of components of a safety system can be useful to 
predict organizational trends in attitudes towards safety. The trends can identify 
areas of an organization that have a strong safety standing as well as areas that 
require a stronger emphasis on safety. Evaluation of an organization’s safety 
culture is particularly important in high-reliability organizations such as energy 






The effectiveness of SMS has led to the program being mandated in some 
industries. ICAO requires international carriers and international airports to have 
SMS in place (Maurino, 2007). Other sectors of aviation, such as domestic 
airports and general aviation (GA) that include flight training, are also 
encouraged to implement SMS (May, 2010).  
 The development and continual reevaluation of SMS policies, procedures, 
and actions is vital to an effective safety risk management program (Gerede, 
2014). Efforts towards establishing a vigorous SMS are partially based on 
feedback from employees and other relevant stakeholders (Chen & Chen, 2011; 
Gill & Shergill, 2004). This study addresses research questions by evaluating 
employee perceptions of the subject organization’s safety policies, procedures, 
and practices.  
1.1 Significance  
     Similar to other high-reliability organizations such as the healthcare and 
energy sectors, the aviation industry is employing SMS as a predictive and 
comprehensive approach to managing safety (Stolzer et. al., 2008). The core 
success variable of a robust safety program is how well the safety program is 
established and sustained in a positive safety culture (IATA, 2011; Lewis, 2008). 
Understanding perceptions of safety culture is an important gap-analysis step in 
an organization’s efforts to create and re-evaluate an effective SMS (Stolzer et al. 
2008). Liou et al. (2008) underscore the importance front-line employee’s role in 






front-line employee understanding and perceptions of safety policies, procedures, 
and practices. Organizational culture can be dynamic (Reason, 1998; Stolzer et 
al. 2008; Taylor, 2012). It is imperative that organizations assess their safety 
culture regularly as part of their on-going effort to safety strategic planning and 
management. 
 This study reflects with ICAO’s standard and recommended practices and 
FAA’s guidelines. The two institutions challenge the aviation community to 
persistently evaluate and cultivate a positive operational safety culture. A 
dynamic positive safety culture is essential in matching the dynamic nature of the 
aviation industry in areas such as technology and environment. The guidelines 
also include the adoption of SMS (ICAO, 2009).  
1.2 Statement of Purpose  
   The purpose of this study was to evaluate safety culture at a regional 
airline by assessing employee understanding and perceptions of their current 
organization’s safety policies, procedures, and practices. Participants were front-
line employees and managers. Front-line employees included pilots, dispatchers, 
flight attendants, and maintenance technicians. In addition, the current research 
aimed to investigate whether there were any statistically-significant differences in 
safety culture perceptions across the front-line employee groups and between 
the front-line employee groups and managers.   
       This study was conducted in three phases. The first two phases were survey 






perceptions of the subject airline’s safety culture, safety climate, and SMS. The 
results from the first two phases of the study formed the building block for the 
third phase, focus groups. The purpose of the focus group was to gain in-depth 
understanding of common themes and concerns identified by the first two phases 
of the study.  
 Understanding of organization safety perception has potential to further 
improve an organization’s safety risk management. Significant differences in 
organization safety culture perception between the managers and front-line 
employees may elicit further investigation for purposes of improving safety. 
Likewise, differences of perceptions across the studied groups of front-line 
employees may suggest latent variables of safety, whether positive or negative. 
The variables may be explored further to reinforce safety risk management in the 
organization. Results from the current study have potential to assist in SMS 
implementation and reevaluation efforts (Cheng & Cheng, 2011).     
1.3 Research Question  
The purpose of this research was to evaluate perceptions of safety culture 
and safety climate at a regional airline by answering the following questions:  
1. What are employee perceptions of the safety climate at the subject airline 
among and across the target study groups: pilots, maintenance 







Ho: Perceptions of the safety climate at the subject airline are positive and 
seamless across all the studied groups: pilots, maintenance 
technicians, dispatchers, flight attendants, and the management of the 
subject airline.  
Ha: Significant variations exist regarding safety climate across the studied 
groups in the subject airline.   
2. What are employee perceptions of the four SMS pillars at the subject 
airline, among and across the target study groups: pilots, maintenance 
technicians, dispatchers, flight attendants, and the management of the 
subject airline?  
Ho: Perceptions of the four pillars of SMS at the subject airline are positive 
and seamless across all the studied groups: pilots, maintenance 
technicians, dispatchers, flight attendants, and the management of the 
subject airline.  
Ha: Significant variations exist regarding the four pillars of SMS across the 
studied groups in the subject airline.   
 
3. What are employee perceptions of the safety culture at the subject airline 
among and across the target study groups: pilots, maintenance 
technicians, dispatchers, flight attendants, and the management of the 
subject airline? 
Ho: Perceptions of the safety culture at the subject airline are positive and 






maintenance technicians, dispatchers, flight attendants, and the 
management of the subject airline 
Ha: Significant variations exist regarding safety culture among and across 
the studied groups in the subject airline 
Ha: Significant variations exist regarding safety culture among the studied 
groups in the subject airline 
4. Are demographic elements such as age, gender, and length of 
employment, significant variables of perception of safety climate and/or 
safety culture at the subject airline?  
Ho Demographic elements such as gender and age are not significant 
variables of safety climate and/or safety culture at the subject airline.  
Ha: Demographic elements such as gender and age are significant 
variables of safety climate and/or safety culture at the subject airline 
1.4 Assumptions 
The study made the following assumptions: 
1. Participants were honest with all their responses.   
2. All respondents were employees of the subject airline during the study 
period.    
3. Participants participated without any undue negative influence.   
4. All employees had access to the subject airline’s Intranet, and to 






5. All employees have access to, and read the subject airline’s monthly 
safety newsletter. 
6. All participants made a single complete attempt on the online survey  
1.5 Limitations  
This study had the following limitations: 
1. Two of the three phases of the study, interview and focus group activities, 
were limited to participants of a single operational location.   
2. The survey study was limited by the number of complete responses.   
3. Participants of the survey phase of the study may not have been a truly 
random sample.  
4. The current study limited evaluated safety climate perceptions to three  
1.6 Delimitations  
The delimitations of the study were:  
1. The study sample was limited to front-line employees: pilots, maintenance 
technicians, flight attendants, and dispatchers, as well as managers.  








1.7 Definition of Key Terms 
Accident – “Any unplanned act or event that results in damage to property, 
material, equipment, cargo, or personal injury or death when not the result 
of enemy action” (Ericson, 2005, p. 14).  
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) – an agency that regulates civil aviation in 
United States (Taylor, 2012) 
Hazard – “A hazard is a condition that could foreseeably cause or contribute to 
an accident” (DOT, 2012, p. 8). 
High Reliability Organization – are organizations that “operate in hazardous, fast-
paced, and complex environments yet avoid catastrophic accidents.” (Tolk, 
Cantu, & Beruvides, 2015, p. 218).  
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) – an agency of the United 
Nations responsible for standardized development of civil aviation to its 
member States worldwide, and for promoting aviation safety.  
Mishap – “An unplanned event or series of events resulting in death, injury, 
occupational illness, damage to or loss of equipment or property, or 
damage to the environment” (DOD, 2000, p. 6) 
Occurrence – “…is [a] tracking system for call-offs when a pilot or flight attendant 
misses work” (“deleted” [study subject airline liaison], March 18, 2016) 
Risk – “...an expression of the future impact of an undesired event in terms of 








Safety – is “…the state in which the possibility of harm to persons or of property 
damage is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level 
through a continuing process of hazard identification and safety risk 
management” (ICAO, 2013, p. 2-1).  
1.8 Summary 
This chapter outlined the background of the study and highlighted the 
study’s significance, purpose, and assumptions. The chapter also addressed 
research questions, limitations, and delimitations of the study. The next chapter 







CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of aviation safety culture and 
aviation safety management, and addresses the concept of a safety 
management system (SMS). In addition, the chapter outlines the role of SMS in 
aviation safety culture and aviation safety in general. The role of aviation safety 
perceptions as an indicator of safety behavior and organizational safety status is 
discussed. The chapter also revisits previously related studies as well as 
discusses theories and approaches related to safety.    
2.1 Safety, Risk, and Hazard  
Scholars, as well as the type of discipline or industry have differed 
regarding the definition of safety. Hudson (2001b) took a conventional 
understanding of safety as “Thou shall not harm” (p. 8.1). Ericson (2005) views 
safety as the process of “identification of hazards, assessment of hazard mishap 
risk, and the control of hazards presenting acceptable risks” (p. 14). ICAO’s 
(2013) position on safety is “… the state at which the risk of harm to persons or 
of property damage is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable 
level through a continuing process of hazard identification and risk management” 
(p. 1-1). This study focused on the ICAO (2013) definition of safety. It recognizes 







definition also acknowledges that aspects of hazards and risk are dynamic, and 
so should be the efforts towards managing safety.   
The process of risk management starts by establishing a standardized 
approach of identifying potential hazards. The Department of Transportation 
(DOT), defines a hazard as “…a condition that could foreseeably cause or 
contribute to an accident” (DOT, 2012, p. 8). A hazard becomes a risk when it is 
no longer contained. This study defines risk as “...an expression of the future 
impact of an undesired event in terms of event severity and event likelihood” 
(FAA, n.d., para. 2).  
Stolzer, Halford, and Goglia, (2011) referred to the total risk an 
organization is subjected to as enterprise risk. Enterprise risk management (ERM) 
is composed of risks such as strategic, financial, compliance, and corporate 
image risks. Others are environmental, project, and operational risk. This study 
focused on operational risk, a risk associated with elements such as assets, 
people, and technology.  This study will be focusing specifically on human 
perceptions. To manage safety, the mentioned aspects of safety have to be 
identified and measured.  
2.2 Identification and Measurement of Safety 
     Vick (2002) described safety as a concept and construct, hence subjective 
and immeasurable. Subsequently, Rose (2006) suggested ascertaining safety in 
some form that allows it to be quantified and more accurately measured. 







safety, risk can be subjective in many variables such as individuals, type of 
discipline, nature of an organization, and individual experiences (Adjekum, et al., 
2015; Taylor, 2012). Risks in high-reliability organizations such as petroleum and 
nuclear industries may lead to catastrophic results to include loss of life, injury, 
and destruction of property. On the other hand, risks in non-high-reliability 
organizations such as commercial and social institutions may often result in 
minimal injury to life and property. It is therefore imperative that industries and 
organizations define and standardize their approach to hazard analysis and risk 
management.  
In 2011, Stolzer et al. outlined five steps of a hazard-management process 
as identifying risk; measuring and assessing of the amount and nature of 
exposures; reducing the magnitude and length of exposure, transferring or 
elimination exposure; reporting the identified risk; and accepting risk. However, 
hazards have to first be perceived or identified. The process of hazard 
identification addresses considerations such as who, what, where, when, and 
why events occurred (Stolzer et al., 2011). These considerations permit for a 
more exhaustive assessment of hazards and their effects. Risk analysis 
appraises the likelihood of an event occurring against the severity of the effects 
of the event (FAA, n.d.). The values, likelihood (as depicted in Table 1) and 
severity, (as depicted in Table 2) of the risks under consideration are defined by 








Table 1 Categorization of the Likelihood of Occurrence of a Risk   
Note. Adopted from “System safety processes,” by FAA, n.d., Retrieved from  
https://www.faasafety.gov/gslac/alc/libview_normal.aspx?id=6877   
 
Table 2 Categorization of Severity Scale 
Severity Scale Definitions 
Catastrophic Results in fatalities and/or loss of the system 
Critical Severe injury and/or major system damage 
Marginal Minor injury and/or minor system damage 
Negligible Less than minor injury and/or less than minor system damage 
Note. Adopted from “System safety processes,” by FAA, n.d., Retrieved from  
https://www.faasafety.gov/gslac/alc/libview_normal.aspx?id=6877   
 A desirable safety status is one with the lowest probability of occurrence of 
risk and the lowest severity of risk. Risk assessment is performed after risk 
analysis. Risk assessment combines the elements of risk analysis and weighs 
them against a standardized, acceptable criteria. A risk assessment model is 
presented in the form of a risk assessment matrix as demonstrated by Table 3. A 
risk matrix can be used as a tool to measure risk, guide mitigation factors, and for 
general safety management.  
Individual Likely to occur often
Fleet Continuously experienced
Individual Will occur several times
Fleet Will occur often
Individual Likely to occur some time.
Fleet Will occur several times
Individual Unlikely to occur,  but possible
Fleet Unlikely to occur but can be reasonably expected to occur
Individual So unlikely, it can be assumed it will not occur 













Table 3 Risk Assessment Matrix 
Note. Adopted from “System safety processes,” by FAA, n.d., Retrieved from  
https://www.faasafety.gov/gslac/alc/libview_normal.aspx?id=6877  
 
While hazard identification is key to risk management and mitigation, 
Ericson (2005) asserted that some hazards are more discernible than others. A 
foreign object on the runway is a case in point for an obvious operational flight 
hazard. On the other hand, poor organizational safety culture may pose hazards 
to operational safety, hazards that may be considerably less apparent compared 
to the case of a foreign object on the runway. Sound safety management 
programs and techniques should be able to discern such latent safety hazards. 
Equally, the techniques ought to be dynamic, to reflect the evolving safety 
considerations such as technology and human behavior (Ericson, 2005).  
Increasingly, focus on safety is shifting towards organizational and 
environmental challenges (Liou et al., 2008; Taylor, 2012). This paradigm calls 







assessed and managed. An ideal model for safety analysis system is one that 
captures both traditionally engineering factors of safety as well as the emerging 
human and organizational variables of safety. Understanding of the 
metamorphosis of approaches to evaluation of safety can provide a clear 
indication of the dynamism of safety variables and the direction the aviation 
industry needs to embrace going forward. 
 
2.2.1 Historical Approach to Evaluating Safety 
Over time, efforts to improve safety through accidental-causation analysis 
has transitioned through three main phases as depicted by figure 1 (FAA, 2015). 
Ericson (2005) identifies the two main groups of safety variables as engineering 
design and organizational factors. The earlier years of aviation saw accidents 
and incidents largely caused by inadequate engineering designs (Ericson, 2005; 
FAA, 2015). Subsequently, safety and operational risk were evaluated mainly 
based on the frequency of accidents and incidents (Liou et al., 2008).  Gibbons, 
von Thaden, and Wiegmann (2006) refer to accidents and incidents as ‘lagging’ 
indicators of safety as they provide clarity of the status of safety after incidents 
and/or accidents. This “fly-crash-fix’ (Stolzer et al., 2008, p. 13) approach to 
managing safety is reactive-based and provides minimal opportunity for proactive 
analysis and mitigation regarding safety practices (Gerede, 2014). Rose (2006) 
points out that the historical method of evaluating safety can still be applied in 








Figure 1. Evolution of the approach to safety.  
Adapted from “Safety Management System SMS explained” by FAA, 2015  
 
Since the 1930s and 1940s, improved engineering design and technology 
continue to eliminate or minimize many of the earlier hazardous design flaws 
(FAA, 2015). Mechanically induced accidents declined during this period. 
However, accidents rates were still significantly high. The ever-increasing 
complexities of emerging technologies presented new challenges to human and 
organizational capabilities. These challenges were very evident during the 1950s 
to 70s era. Attention turned to human factors issues due to an increase in 
human-error related accidents and incidents. Human factors efforts concentrated 
on how individuals and crews performed together, as well as with their working 
environment. Programs such as Crew Resource Management and Maintenance 
Resource Management (MRM) were introduced to address human-related safety 
issues. These efforts further improved the industry’s safety. Gradually however, 
additional analysis of accidents and incidents indicated a series of opportunities 







accidents were determined to be related to organizational decisions and attitudes 
(FAA, 2015). 
In the late 70’s, management of safety started to take a more proactive 
viewpoint. The aviation industry started to collect and analyze more safety 
related data to learn, project, and mitigate recurring poor safety practices. The 
rates of aviation accidents and incidents have continued to decline since. 
However, Liou at al. (2008) note low accident and incident frequencies do not 
necessarily equate to a high safety standards. The Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), ICAO, and other stakeholders in the aviation safety such 
as operators and airport managers recognize the need to continually improve 
aviation safety to address all modern concerns (ICAO, 2009).  
2.2.2 Modern Approach to Evaluating Safety 
Traditionally, the aviation industry has taken a reactive approach to 
identifying hazards (Stolzer et al., 2008). As aviation safety improved with the 
advancement of science and technology, the industry acknowledged the need to 
be proactive in the industry’s safety. In the proactive method, the industry actively 
seeks to identify hazardous conditions through analysis of the organizational 
processes (FAA, 2015). A proactive method relies heavily on data-analysis to 
identify potential hazards. Appropriate mitigation factors are then put in place to 
promote safer practices. While this method, currently in place, has had a 
significantly positive impact on aviation safety, the industry is always in need to 
devise newer and more effective ways to improve safety (ICAO, 2009). A 







A predictive approach to safety analyzes system processes and the 
environment to identify potential unsafe acts. SMS embodies the predictive 
approach (FAA, 2015). SMS underscores the importance of attitude and the 
environment, specifically, organizational processes (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office [GAO], 2014; Stolzer et al. 2008). SMS calls for in-depth 
knowledge of “hazard identification, risk management, system theory, human 
factors engineering, organizational culture, quality engineering and management, 
quantitative methods, and decision theory” (Stolzer et al. 2008).  
The modern technique of safety and risk management is shifting towards a 
heavily data-driven and risk-based practice (GAO, 2014). ICAO and the FAA are 
championing this approach, enshrined in a safety management architecture 
known as Safety Management System (SMS), to aviation communities worldwide 
(ICAO, 2009). SMS focuses on developing an organizational safety culture that 
enhances safety. Unlike historical methods, of managing safety that were more 
dependent on ‘lagging’ safety indicators, modern methods focus on identifying 
and managing latent safety variables (GAO, 2014).  
Effective management of safety requires sound policies, procedures, and 
practices. Equally important is the behavior of employees regarding the 
stipulated policies, procedures, and practices. While it may be difficult to 
measure behavior, Taylor (2012) suggests that evaluating employee beliefs 
provides a good indicator of their likely behavior. Taylor proposes links between 
beliefs, espoused values, attitudes, artifacts, and behavior. Values are shaped by 







organizational culture may serve as a clearer indicator of likely behavior. Belief 
and values that do not align with positive safety behavior may indicate ‘leading’ 
(Yule, 2003) safety indicators and provoke investigation into possible mitigation 
measures (Taylor, 2012). The ‘leading’ safety indicators allow for evaluation of 
hazards before occurrences of accidents and/or incidents, in essence, a 
predictive safety approach (Yule, 2003).   
To ensure a robust safety management program, understanding of the 
organizational and other human factors variables becomes very vital – perhaps 
as important as understanding the performance of the mechanical and 
engineering aspects of as system. There is need for a robust data acquisition, 
management, and processing architecture that captures both engineering-
centered as well as human factors-centered data. Effective data acquisition 
requires pertinent and vigorous safety reporting systems.   
2.3 Safety Reporting Systems 
Scholars including Liou et al. (2008) have demonstrated the significance of 
safety reporting systems in an organization. SMS and other modern safety 
programs rely significantly on data. Data has to be efficiently acquired, recorded, 
and properly processed to identify potential hazardous patterns. The hazards can 
then be remedied accordingly. Aspects such as ease of use, availability, and 
accessibility are important to a data reporting and data management system. 
Data capturing systems should also be valid, readily available, and reliable (Liou 







The GAIN Working Group (2004) cites legal and insurance variables as 
motivators for mandatory safety reporting by organizations. A major limitation of 
safety reporting is the tendency of humans to limit full disclosure for fear of blame 
or incrimination. Consequently, a significant number of incidents may go 
completely unreported, which may hamper efforts to improve safety. Other 
constraints of reporting culture include distrust of the system’s confidentiality, and 
the workload related to reporting. Nevertheless, factors that motivate employees 
to report, such as perceived benefit, can improve safety reporting. Automatic 
logging systems and other engineering measures are possible ways to mitigate 
human reporting limitations. However, engineering solutions can often be difficult 
to implement in existing systems (The GAIN Working Group, 2004).  
Stolzer et al. (2011) identifies four main streams from which data is 
acquired during operational risk management as auditing, investigations, people 
reports, and data. Audit describes data that is captured by independent teams 
while conducting on-site visits. An ‘audit’ can be internal, performed by the 
organization’s own staff, or external, performed by an entity that is not part of the 
organization under review. ‘Investigations’ defines an assessment that takes 
place following incidents or/and accidents. The data method uses an engineering 
solution such as the operational flight data monitoring system (FDM), also known 
as flight operations quality assurance (FOQA) (Landry, 2012). People reports 
concerns data generated manually by personnel, such as through the suggestion 
box, or through telephone call. A pilot report or anonymous hotline are good 







2.3.1 Voluntary data recording streams 
Flight Operations Quality Assurance - FOQA 
 FOQA is a data management system that records electronic flight 
parameters and aircraft systems status. Parameters, such as flight manual 
limitations, are subsequently analyzed for significant anomalies to help identify 
potential high-risk trends. According to the FAA (2014), FOQA is a voluntary and 
anonymous program that captures broad operational data to identify hazardous 
patterns such as systematic deviations from flight protocol.  A significant 
reduction of accidents to a rate lower than the current is projected should this 
program be used properly. The key for the success of the program is the 
objectivity of the data captured as well as “application of corrective actions and 
follow-up” (para. 2). Due to its effectiveness, the FAA is engaging aviation 
communities across the world to promote the use of the program (FAA, 2014).  
Mitchell, Sholy, and Stolzer (2007) propose the adoption of the FOQA 
program in the General Aviation (GA) sector. In addition to improving operational 
performance and safety, other areas of potential benefit include training and 
maintenance services. A major hindrance to the adoption of FOQA program in 
GA has been the high cost developing and certifying the program. A FOQA 
program for GA use (FOQA-GA) is one feasible solution to managing the cost 
variable. FOQA-GA is a “less sophisticated” and “autonomous system that is 
independent of the aircraft platform” (p. 2) but functions in much similar way to  
the standard FOQA programs common with major carriers and at a much lower 







An advantage of an engineering solutions like the FOQA program are their 
ability to transfer data automatically and in real-time. In addition to higher speeds 
and efficiency, automatically transmitted data overcome some of the limitations of 
human-data transmission methods such as non-reporting and false or partial 
reporting. Humans can report inadequately for a number of reasons including 
fear of being reprimanded and inadequate motivation to report. The accuracy of 
reported data is important in safety management because the effectiveness of 
safety promotion and mitigation factors presume a higher degree of accuracy of 
the data used.  Another method of capturing date is through people reports, 
usually in the form of voluntary safety reporting systems (Stolzer, 2011). 
Aviation Safety Reporting System – ASRS  
People reports voluntary reporting systems allow users to report incidents 
anonymously. The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is the most 
common voluntary safety reporting system in the U.S. (National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration [NASA], 2015). ASRS is funded by the FAA and managed 
NASA to safeguard anonymity of those who report safety incidents. ASRS 
provides a platform for personnel such as pilots, aircraft technicians, and air 
traffic controllers to report incidents or hazardous situations. Data can be 
recorded through an online electronic platform or recorded manually then mailed 
by surface means. Recorded data include air traffic communications, near midair 








According to NASA (2015), the ASRS program covers operations in flight 
segments such as en-route, departure, and landing.  ASRS assures anonymity 
and immunity from punitive action to reporters if incidents are reported within 10 
days of occurrence.  Submitted data is stripped of all identifiable information such 
as the reporter and the institution names to ensure anonymity. Exceptions to 
legal immunity include committal of criminal offense and accidents, as well as 
having a prior Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) violation within the past five 
years of reporting.  Processed reports are made available to the aviation 
community for the purpose of improving aviation safety (NASA, 2015).  
Aviation Safety Action Plan – ASAP.   
    A product of the FAA’s (2002) Advisory Circular AC No: 120-66B, ASAP 
closely mirrors ASRS. ASAP encourages employees of participating airlines and 
certified repair station to voluntarily “report safety information that may be critical 
to identifying potential precursors to accidents without fear of disciplinary action” 
from the employer or the FAA (p. 1). Pilots, maintenance technician, flight 
attendants, and dispatchers are all encouraged to participate.  Incidents have to 
be reported within 24 hours of occurrence. Other exceptions to immunity include 
deliberate violations of safety, criminal activity and falsification. A Safety Event 
Review Committee (ERC) usually comprised of representatives from the FAA, 
employee union, and employer, review all reports and have to reach a consensus 
or corrective action. The corrective action may include remedial training, which 







knowledge outside the ASAP reports, administrative actions include an FAA 
Warning Notice and FAA Letter of Correction (FAA, 2002).   
Other anonymous and non-punitive safety reporting agencies include the 
Air Traffic Organization (ATO). ATO is the operational sector of the FAA that 
provides air navigation services in the U.S. ATO maintains its own Voluntary 
Safety Reporting Program (VSRP) (FAA, 2014).  
The foundation of a non-punitive self-reporting system is built on the 
principle of trust (Hudson, 2001b; NASA, 2015). When reporting incidents, 
employees have to believe that their anonymity will be guaranteed and there will 
be no punitive measures toward them as a result. Perceived lack of trust and just 
culture can lead to lower frequency of incident reporting. The FAA (2008) 
identifies reporting culture as another characteristic of a good safety reporting 
system. An organization needs to nurture a reporting culture, which enhances the 
willingness of employees to report incidents and accidents. Additionally, a just 
culture encourages positive employee reporting behavior. Employees feel that 
they will be treated fairly upon reporting, yet still be held accountable for their 
roles. It is also important to have bottom-up communication concerning safety 
issues to enable management to constantly and effectively reevaluate safety 
policy. Safety feedback is especially important to front-line employees. An 
employee may feel listened to and encouraged towards a positive safety attitude 
and behavior such as safety reporting if they receive positive feedback on 
reported incidents. Safety promotion and communication reflects organizational 







 Lower frequency of reported safety concerns may not necessarily equate 
to safer operations (Liou et al., 2008). Since safety evaluation and management 
increasingly rely on data (ICAO, 2009; Rose, 2006), the level at which safety 
culture is perceived to permeate an organization can affect self-reporting 
behavior. This underscores the need for organizations to constantly reevaluate 
their safety culture and climate. Other determinants of employee self-reporting 
include knowledge of hazards, knowledge of a hazard reporting system, and 
accessibility to a hazard reporting system (Adjekum et al., 2015; Hudson, 2001b). 
The reliability and verifiability of data captured is important as the accuracy and 
mitigation measures are largely based on the data. Efforts to apply analyzed data 
and investigate incidents as well as accidents are guided by scientific techniques 
as a set of theories.   
2.4 Accident Assessment Tools and Theories   
Heinrich’s Law 
Heinrich (1959) performed an elaborate examination of accidents and 
incidents reports in 1930s. Results from the study suggested that for every 
serious injury event, there had been approximately 29 accidents with minor 
injuries, and 330 accidents with no injuries, a ratio of 1:29:330 respectively. 
Reasoning that because many accidents have common root causes, Heinrich 
theorized that mitigating the more prone accidents that had no injuries would, in 
retrospect, eliminate or reduce likelihood of injury-accidents. Bird and Germain 







The researchers established a new ratio for accident projection, 1:10:30:600. The 
ratio corresponded to one serious injury accident, for every 10 minor injuries, 30 
accidents resulting in property damage, and 600 incidents with no visible injuries 
or damage (see figure 2).   
 
   Figure 2. Bird and Germain’s Safety triangle.  
   Adapted from “Safety management manual” by ICAO, 2009 
 
Comparatively, the U.S. commercial airlines sector of air transport averages 
about 50 accidents per year (Stolzer et al., 2008). Of these, two are categorized 
as ‘major’, three as ‘serious’, 25 ‘with injury’, and 25 ‘with damage’.  
Heinrich’s Law (Heinrich, 1959) and Bird and Germain’s safety triangle 
(ICAO, 2006) suggest that whereas it is challenging to reduce safety risk to zero, 
there are opportunities for the aviation industry to be more proactive in managing 
safety (Bird & Germain, 1969; Stolzer et al., 2008). However, Heinrich’s Law has 
come under considerable criticism. Manuele (2013) asserts that the Law 
assumes two myths:  








b. Reducing incident frequency will achieve an equivalent 
reduction in injury severity (p. 4). 
Manuele’s (2013) study indicated effectiveness in reducing frequency in smaller 
injury-free accidents. However, there was no positive bearing, or in some cases, 
there was negative bearing on the more severe incidents. The researcher 
suggests an effective and unbiased reporting of incidents is vital for safety and 
accidents analysis. Only then can a thorough investigation to identify latent 
unsafe practices take place (Manuele, 2013).  
Manuele’s (2013) observations mirror the current aviation industry’s 
viewpoint that is shifting its emphasis from focusing mostly on events 
represented by the peak of the safety triangle, to the base (Liou, 2008; Reason, 
1990, 1997; Taylor 2012). More so, the shift is also targeting elements of safety 
such as organizational culture, to develop and foster a more positive safety 
culture. Reason’s (1997) Swiss Cheese model further expands the safety triangle 
by underscoring the need to focus on safety reporting in order to improve the 
chances of discovering latent unsafe conditions. 
The Swiss Cheese model of human error 
In 1990, Reason proposed a model of the causation of human error that 
was later known as the ‘Swiss – Cheese’ model. In the model, four slices of the 
Swiss cheese lined up side by side, represent the four levels of safety defenses. 
The levels are Organizational Influences, Unsafe Supervision, Preconditions for 
Unsafe Acts, and Unsafe Acts, in descending order of hierarchy. These defenses 







accident or incident occurs when a straight line can go through all the four slices 
or stages of a system’s defense (Reason, 1990).  
Reason (1997) points out Unsafe Acts as the most important layer of safety 
as it is the last line of operational defense. According to Shappell and Wiegmann 
(2000), the aviation industry often refers to the Unsafe Acts stage of system 
defense during accident investigation as pilot or human error. Reason (1990) 
denotes that Unsafe Acts receive the most attention during an investigation 
following an accident or incident. It is the action or inaction of a crew that results 
in an accident. Preconditions for Unsafe Acts describes prevailing variables, for 
example, fatigue and poor crew coordination that lead to poor decision-making. 
The decisions are wrong actions or inactions that may lead to an accident or 
incident. For example, a pilot may continue flight into weather minimums beyond 
their skills or training due to organizational pressure to arrive on time.  
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts are attributed to poor or inadequate supervision, 
otherwise known by the model as Unsafe Supervision. The general manner in 
which an organization carries out its practices ranging from budgeting, human 
resource management, and culture influences safety variables including 
supervision. This highest stage of safety defense is referred to as Organizational 
Influences (Reason, 2009).  
An advantage inherent in the Swiss Cheese model is its thoroughness to 
investigate beyond the actions and inactions that ultimately result in an accident 







and weakness in the system’s safety beyond the unsafe acts layer. It investigates 
root course of accidents in an entire system. 
Grady (2014, para. 5) defined a system as a composition of “entities that 
work together through relationships and with their environment”.  Systems have 
an inherent ability to fail (Ericson, 2005). A system fails when it does not meet its 
expected requirements. Successful breaches in all layers of safety result in 
failures, which increase mishap risks such as injury, damage, and death. The 
Swiss-Cheese model conceptualizes accidents as a result of “successive 
breaches in multiple system defense” (ICAO, 2013, p. 2-3). 
ICAO (2013) categorizes failures into two groups: 
 Active failures – “…actions or inactions, including errors and 
violations, which have an immediate adverse effect” (p. 2-3). 
 Latent conditions – “…are those that exist in the aviation system well 
before a damaging outcome is experienced” (p. 2-3). 
Active failures are largely associated with front-line employees and are closely 
related to unsafe acts. Latent conditions may remain dormant for a long time, 
may fail to be viewed as harmful, and can eventually lead to accidents. Latent 
conditions frequently result from lack of positive safety culture, conflicting 
organizational goals, inferior equipment, procedural design, and faulty 
organizational structures or poor decision-making by the management (ICAO, 
2013).  
 Ultimately, a desirable system is one with benefits such as high productivity, 







especially in high-reliability organizations. Individual industries determine their 
own balance of risk and benefit. This balance defines an organization’s safety 
margins and safety risk management. The Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System is a safety analysis program that focuses and elaborates 
further on latent failures.  
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) 
In 2002, Shappell and Wiegmann further developed Reason’s (1990) Swiss 
Cheese model to elaborate more on the four levels of safety nets; Organizational 
Influences, Unsafe Supervision, Preconditions for Unsafe Acts, and Unsafe Acts. 
The researchers referred to the resultant accident and incident analysis tool as 
the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). Unsafe Acts 
can be in the form of Errors or Violations (Reason, 1990). Reason (1990) defines 
errors as efforts that achieve unintended results and violations as intentional 
actions or inactions designed to cause a negative outcome.    
Shappell and Wiegmann (2002) sub-categorized errors as either Decision 
errors, referring to poor decision making such as responding wrongly to an 
emergency and Skilled-Based error such as applying poor technique to a flight 
maneuver. A third, Perception error, may include visual illusion that results in, for 
example, controlled flight into terrain (CFIT). Violations describe a blatant 
disregard for established rules and guidelines. Flying an unauthorized approach 
and failing to adhere to training rules are examples of violations. Violations are 
either Routine, occurring frequently in the organization or Exceptional, occurring 







indicate a flaw in the organizational safety culture. Preconditions for Unsafe Acts 
include Substandard Conditions of Operations and Substandard Practices of 
Operator. The former category includes an Adverse Mental State such as 
complacency, Adverse Psychological State including mental illness, and a 
Physical/Mental Limitation that allows unsafe operational conditions such as 
visual limitation. The subcategory Substandard Practices of Operators is 
comprised of two subcategories, Crew Resource Management (CRM) and 
Personal Readiness. The CRM component entails coordination among personnel 
including good communication that extends to before and after a flight activity. 
Personnel Readiness describes mental and physical preparation for work, for 
example, getting sufficient rest to effectively focus on work (Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 2002).  
Regarding the Unsafe Supervision layer, Shappell and Wiegmann (2002) 
designed four subcategories. Inadequate Supervision involves the ability of a 
supervisor to provide necessary motivation and guidance to an employee. 
Another, Planned Inappropriate Operations describes the level of preparation 
that goes into planning an operation such as allowing for adequate planning time. 
Failure to Correct a Known Problem and Supervisory violations concern blatant 
disregard for rules and regulations. Organizational Influences, the first layer of 
safety net, includes Resource Management, Organizational Climate, and 
Organizational Process subcategories. Resource Management is focused on 
management’s decision-making process regarding allocation of resources such 







values most. Safety needs have to be accorded matching priority in resource 
allocations. Researchers defined Organization Climate as “…broad class of 
organizational variables that influence worker performance” (p. 11). Also known 
as the ‘working environment’, climate includes variables such as structures, 
policies, and culture that define how an organization operates. Organizational 
Process involves procedures and oversight of an organization’s operations 
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 2002). 
The current study focuses on the culture component of the Organizational 
Climate safety, a sublayer of Organizational Influences. This is the highest and 
first layer of safety. Ideally, eliminating or mitigating risk at this layer may prove 
the most effective method of managing latent failures. The iceberg safety model 
provides yet another perspective to safety analysis.  
 
The Iceberg Model 
A positive safety culture coupled with employee familiarity with a safety 
reporting system could promote efficient safety reporting behavior (Adjekum et al., 
2015). As presented by Rose (2006), the Iceberg model describes the 
relationship between reporting culture, data integrity, and interpretation of data. 
In the model, an entire iceberg represents total risk. Visible risk, which is the 
observable and reported incidents and accidents, is symbolized by the visible 
part of the iceberg. Latent risk, not readily apparent, often not even from captured 
data, is denoted by the submerged portion of the iceberg. In an ideal safety 







Capturing as much valuable data as possible optimizes the visibility of the entire 
iceberg.   
The goal of SMS is to attain an organization safety culture that continually 
nurtures positive safety behavior such as recording of incidents and accidents 
(Rose, 2006). Brown, Willis, and Prussia (2001) asserted that every accident 
results from a failure in the organization. Tsay et al. (2014) supported the idea 
and suggested a weak safety culture is often the latent cause of human factors 
related accidents and incidents, and the cause of long term safety implications. 
McDonald, Corrigan, Daly, and Cromie, (2000) had earlier proposed that airlines 
should consider including management and organizational factors in their safety 
management systems. The researchers argued a comprehensive approach 
would be more effective in managing latent safety variables, echoing other 
researchers such as Reason (1997), and Shappell and Wiegmann (2000). 
Modern safety management systems such as SMS are designed to promote 
safety reporting to maximize exposure of the iceberg. They purport to make 
safety reporting and other positive safety behavior part of the organizational 
culture (FAA, 2015).  
2.5 Safety Culture and Safety Climate  
The terms terms safety culture and safety climate are often, erroniously, 
interchanged (Hecker & Goldenhar, 2014; Zohar, 2010). Although there has been 
a wide breadth of studies partaining to safety culture, there is no widely agreed 







Peyton 2012; Reason, 1998). For example, Cooper (2000) defines safety culture 
as “Shared values, actions and behavior that demonstrate a commitment to 
safety over competing goals and demands” (p. 113). Cooper (2000) suggests 
safety culture as a dominating sub-component of corporate culture. As such, 
safety culture is a critical element of safety, especially in high-reliability 
organization. Patankar et al.’s (2012) definition of safety culture is “why we do 
what we do” (p. 5). A common thread among many of the definitions of safety 
culture is the inclusion of the behaviors, values, and actions elements (Cooper, 
2000). Patanker et al (2012) argues that safety culture has two components, 
behavior and attitude. The behavioral study is concerned with understanding the 
link between behavior and consequences, such as accidents. The attitude 
component pertains to understanding of the dominant psychological status within 
an organization. The present study is concerned about the latter component of 
safety culture. The present defines safety culture as:   
A dynamically balanced, adaptable state resulting from the configuration 
of values, leadership strategies, and attitudes that collectively impact 
safety performance at the individual, group, and enterprise level. Simply 
stated, safety culture is a dynamic configuration of factors at multiple 
levels that influences safety performance. (Patanker & Subin, 2010, pp. 
102) 
In 1980, Zohar conducted what among the first safety climate studies. In 
the study, in which he developed a safety climate survey by analyzing results 







shared by employees of the relative importance of safety behavior in their work. 
In the year 2000, Zohar argued that safety climate pertains to perceptions shared 
regarding the priority given to safety, against productivity. Essentially, safety 
climate describes employee perception of the management’s commitment to 
employee safety and health (Flin et al, 2000). The present study recognizes 
safety climate as presented by Patankar et al. (2012) as the attitude and opinion 
of employee regarding safety in an organization.  
Safety culture and safety climate focus of safety though they are different 
constructs (Hecker & Goldenhar, 2014). Safety climate pertains to the prevailing, 
albeit temporal status of perception of safety in an organization, while safety 
culture relates to deeper long-held perceptions of underlying traits and value of 
safety (Patankar et al., 2012; Patankar & Subin, 2010; Seo, Torabi, Blair, & Ellis, 
2004).  
Aviation accident rates have improved since the inception of aviation due 
to sound engineering practices and adoption of effective human factors 
measures such as crew resource management (CRM) (FAA, 2015). The focus 
on improving safety by the aviation industry is increasingly shifting towards other 
elements of safety, such as organizational factors. Positive safety culture aims to 
instill perceptions and attitudes that promote desirable safety behaviors, such as 
reporting of incidents and accidents.  Referring to safety culture as the “human 
performance element” (Taylor, 2012, p. 2), underscores the role of safety culture 







culture can result in “failure in designated engineering or procedural safety 
barriers” (Taylor, 2012, p. 2). 
 
2.5.1 Background and Development of Safety Culture 
The term ‘safety culture’ is thought to have been first reported in the 
International Atomic Energy Agency’s Chernobyl accident report (Patankar et al., 
2012; Reason, 1998; Tsay, 2015). The evolution of safety culture can be traced 
back to a series of accidents in the 1980s, mostly in Europe, that heralded the 
systematic evaluation and management of safety (Hudson, 2001a). Prior to the 
mid-1980s, safety was viewed as an individual responsibility. In 1974 a chemical 
plant close to Flixborough, a village in North Lincolnshire England, exploded 
causing 28 fatalities and 36 serious injuries. Improper engineering modifications 
were identified as the cause of the accident. This event, also known as the 
Flixborough accident, resulted in among other things, the first efforts to formalize 
safety plans, already in place within organizations (Hudson, 2001a).  
Two years later, a chemical plant explosion in northern Milan, Italy, 
released a plume of dioxin over Seveso, a nearby town (Tsay, 2015). Known as 
the Seveso incident, its effects included animal deaths, abortions, and ailments 
such as nausea and skin irritation. Implications for safety included a European 
Union directive, 76/82/EEC, also known as the Seveso directive. The directive 
called for standardization of industrial safety regulations (Hudson, 2001a).  
In 1988 (Hudson, 2001a; Thompson, 2015), Piper Alpha, an offshore oil 







as the worst offshore accident in the world, the Piper Alpha accident further 
generated advocacy for systematic management of safety. The explosion was 
triggered when an employee turned on a pump that was under repair, against 
safety guidelines. Investigation determined that failure to follow established 
maintenance protocol created conditions that led to the unsafe acts of the 
employee in question (Thomson, 2015). The Piper Alpha accident further elicited 
the development of SMS. SMS was subsequently integrated into healthcare 
management, and later adopted by other industries including nuclear and 
aviation (Hudson, 2001a). Figure 2 demonstrates Hudson’s (2001a) description 
of the development of safety culture.  
 
Figure 3. The evolution of safety culture 
 Adapted from “Safety management and safety culture: the long, hard and 
winding road” by P.T.W. Hudson, 2001a, Occupational health and safety 









2.5.2 Types of Safety Culture 
Scholars have presented various ideologies of a safety culture such as 
Westrum’s (1993) model. The well-documented model (see Table 4) has three 
categories, pathological, bureaucratic, and generative safety cultures. 
Table 4 Westrum’s Original Safety Model 
Pathological Bureaucratic Generative 
Information is hidden Information may be ignored 
Information is actively 
sought 





Responsibilities are shared 
Bridging is discouraged 
Bridging is allowed but 
discouraged 
Bridging is rewarded 
Failure is covered up 
Organization is just and 
merciful 
Failure causes enquiry 
New ideas are crushed New ideas create problems New ideas are welcome 
Note. Adapted from “Cultures with Requisite Imagination” by R. Westrum, 1993 in In J.Wise, P. 
Stager & J. Hopkin (Eds.) Verification and Validation in Complex Systems, Human Factors Issues. 
p. 402. Copyright 1993 by Springer  
 
Using Westrum’s (1993) original safety model as bedrock, Hudson’s (2001a) 








Figure 4.. Evolution of model of safety culture. 
Adapted from “Safety management and safety culture: the long, hard and winding road” 
by P.T.W. Hudson, 2001, Occupational health and safety management systems, 3-32. 
 
Hudson (2001a) cites an organization with a pathological state of safety culture 
as one that does not put any significant effort towards managing safety. 
Employees do not take any personal responsibilities and accountabilities for 
safety. In a reactive safety culture, an organization, usually experiencing a higher 
number of accidents, takes appropriate corrective measures after the fact. In the 
calculative safety culture, an organization realizes the importance of having 
systems in place to manage safety hazards. A calculative safety culture is 
characterized by considerations of elements such as cost-benefit analysis and 
quantitative risk assessment techniques in safety matters. Some form of a 
structured management system pertaining to safety is usually in place. While 
regulatory platforms can promote safer practices, a generative safety culture is 
ideal for optimum safety behaviors. A generative culture is characterized by a 







importance of safety in their organization. The belief is strong to the point of 
almost invisibility as safety considerations become part of daily organizational 
and personal tasks (Hudson, 2001a).  
 Comparatively, the FAA (2015) groups safety culture into three categories, 
reactive, proactive, and predictive (figure 5). The first two categories are 
acknowledged by other scholars (Gerede, 2014; Liou et al., 2008; Stolzer et al., 
2008) as approaches to safety management. The FAA (2015) advocates to the 
aviation community, the achievement of a predictive safety culture. A predictive 
approach to safety focuses on the environment and organizational processes to 
identify future problems (FAA, 2015).   
 
Figure 5.. Methods of identifying hazard 
From “Safety Management System SMS explained” by FAA, 2015 
 
The historical methods of safety management, by themselves, are not 
ideal for managing safety in a generative safety culture organization (Cooper, 







safety procedures, systems, policies, and practices could improve the 
prominence and effectiveness of organizational safety in organizations with 
generative cultures. This study evaluated employee perception of their 
organization’s safety programs and practices.  
 
2.5.3 Evaluating Safety Culture and Safety Climate 
Understanding safety culture may help identify latent unsafe safety 
variables and improve safety (von Thaden, 2008). Safety culture assessment is 
most effective when carried out by a third party specialist (Taylor, 2012), as well 
as when the entire hierarchy is evaluated (Cooper, 2000; Taylor, 2012; Wreathall, 
1995). Involvement of third party minimizes “any possible compromise or, 
hierarchical pressures that may arise from an internally staffed review” (Taylor, p. 
161). However, lack of validated assessment instruments is among the major 
challenges to investigating safety culture and safety climate (Adjekum, 2014; 
Patankar et al., 2012). As such, scholars have called for further research 
regarding validation tools (Adjekum, 2014; Chen & Chen, 2011). Nevertheless, 
some efforts have been successful in evaluating safety culture.   
Safety culture and safety climate may be evaluated qualitatively, 
quantitatively, or using both methods (Cooper, 2000, Gibbons et al., 2006; 
Patankar et al., 2012; Taylor, 2012). Historical reviews, participant observation, 
group discussion, and case studies are examples of qualitative methods. A 
mixed method approach is ideal as it allows for a comprehensive evaluation of 







et al. (2012) presents a more comprehensive classification of safety culture and 
safety assessment tools in four groups: case analysis, survey analysis, 
qualitative analysis, and quasi-experimental analysis.  
Case studies are suitable for analyzing accidents, incidents, and 
undesirable events (Patankar et al., 2012). However, the retrospective nature of 
case studies renders them useless for events already occurred. Surveys are 
ideal for evaluating attitudes and opinions as well as provide the current 
organization safety climate standing. Surveys are practical for evaluating 
employee perceptions of safety. Qualitative analysis concerns techniques 
including interviews, field observations, and focus groups. Qualitative analyses 
are ideal for determining the predominant safety cultures at an organization. 
Qualitative analyses describe the prevailing policies, procedures, and practices in 
place at an organization, and how they relate to safety culture. Qualitative 
research may also help researchers understand organizational group dynamics, 
underlying values related to safety culture, as well as feedback on success and 
failures associated with safety. The knowledge about elements of safety culture 
such as perceptions of safety, safety values, and group dynamics may be useful 
in improving an organization’s safety (Patankar et. al, 2012).    
Qualitative methods allow researchers to interact directly with participants 
and capture participants’ opinions and views (Wreathall, 1995). Qualitative 
approaches facilitate in-depth understanding and interpretation of data, results, 
and observations. Quantitative methods are easier to carry out and interpret as 







capture and measure data numerically. Highly standardized and calibrated, 
quantitative methods include well-structured interviews; questionnaires and 
surveys; and Q-sorts (Wreathall, 1995).  
Rousseau (1990) asserted that quantitative methods are ideal for 
measuring an organization’s responses to standardized stimuli. Standard stimuli 
allow for common reference points with which to base responses from and 
understand variations within and across respondents.  
Taylor (2012) and Wreathall (1995) point out culture, and safety climate 
(Cooper, 2001) can vary across groups in an organization, based on elements 
such as profession and job function. Wreathall (1995) suggests including cross-
sectional analysis in organizational and cultural studies to investigate such 
variations. In addition to concerns pertaining to validity of data collection tools 
(Adjekum, 2014; Patankar et al., 2012), another major limitation of safety climate 
and safety culture studies is that they only provide a snap shot of culture (Cooper, 
2000; Patankar et al., 2012). Due to the dynamic nature of cultures, Cooper 
(2000) and Patankar et al. (2012) suggest longitudinal studies to establish safety 
culture and safety climate trends.  
Ultimately, the use of the combined methods provides a more 
comprehensive study analysis (Wreathall, 1995). The current study proposed to 
employ both qualitative and quantitative methods. A method of analysis of safety 
culture is through the use of safety climate surveys.  
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) (2005) defines a safety climate survey 







regarding employees’ attitudes, opinions and feelings towards safety, and its 
management within the organization” (p. 16). Safety culture surveys enable an 
organization to “monitor the success of initiatives to improve safety culture” and 
“Improve employee awareness of and involvement in safety” (HSE, 2005, p. 16).  
Safety culture evaluation methods share similar key aspects to those of 
safety management systems, such as assurance of confidentiality, ease of use, 
and accessibility (HSE, 2005). Evaluation methods should facilitate effective 
communication with participants and be relevant to their area of work to realize 
research validity. Other considerations include the logistical aspect of accessing 
participants and the duration of time required for a particular method. For 
example, surveys that are too long may promote partial completion by 
participants (HSE, 2005).  
2.6 Group Cultures and Safety Related Theories  
Cooper (2000) views safety culture as the most significant element of as a 
corporate culture. Helmreich and Merritt (2001) describe corporate or 
organizational culture as “a complex framework of national, organizational and 
professional attitudes and values within which groups and individuals function” (p. 
552). In 1998, Helmreich described these three structures as: 
1. national culture encompasses the value system of particular 
nations, 
2. organizational/corporate culture differentiates the behavior found in 







3. professional culture differentiates the behavior found in different 
professional groups. (p. 24) 
This study focused on organizational safety culture. Reason 
(2000) described organizational safety culture as the “ability of individuals or 
organizations to deal with risks and hazards so as to avoid damage or losses and 
yet still achieve their goals” (p. 4). Comprehensively, a safety culture can be 
understood as the expression of the aggregate effect of individual and group 
attitudes, competencies, values, and behaviors, which collectively determine the 
organization’s approach to safety matters (Clarke, 1999; ICAO, 2009).   
 
Reciprocal safety culture model  
Cooper (2000) advocated for examining safety culture beyond shared 
values and beliefs, while assessing organizational cultures. These additional 
elements include the relationships between people (psychological), jobs 
(behavioral) and the organization (situational). The reciprocal safety culture 
model reflects the concept of safety culture as a function of the relationship of 
three properties, person, situation, as they pertains to safety climate and culture 
under, two groups. The Internal psychological factors group refers to the person 
while the External observable factors group comprises of the behavior and 
situation components. The safety climate refers to individuals’ attitudes and 
perceptions towards an organization’s safety systems and safety environment. 
Safety climate may be measured through perceptual audits such as a safety 







situation and the behavior components. The situation describes the safety 
management system in place, which can be evaluated objectively through audits 
and inspections. The behavior component refers to safety behavior. The 
organizational culture is then a product of the dynamic reciprocal associations 
between an organization’s members’ perceptions and attitudes towards the 
organization’s goals; members' daily guided behavior; and the quality and 
accessibility of the organization’s structures intended to support expected 
behavior (Cooper, 2000).  
Patankar and Sabins’ (2010) provides a more comprehensive view of 
safety culture, presented as a pyramid composed of four layered components. 
The Behaviors layer forms the tip of the pyramid and determines safety 
performance. The other three layers in ascending order are Safety climate, 
Safety strategies, and Safety values. Safety climate refers to employee “attitudes 
and opinions regarding safety” (p. 3). Safety strategies pertain to the 
organizational structures such as policies and procedures put in place to manage 
safety while safety values refer to underlying tenets related to safety in an 
organization (Patankar & Sabin, 2010).    
The current study proposed to investigate the three facets represented by 
Bandura’s (1986) Social Cognitive Theory and Cooper’s (2000) concept of 
reciprocal causation. Employee perceptions (the psychological aspect) were 
evaluated against employee jobs (behavior) as well as the organization’s 
structures and environment (situation). Cooper’s theory shares some parallelism 







Geller (1994) theorized that an ideal safety culture is composed of three 
elements, individual, environment, and behavior. The individual component 
defines the psychological and mental states as abilities, intelligence, and 
knowledge. The environmental aspect includes standard operation procedures 
(SOPs) as well as tools and equipment. The behavioral component comprises 
actions such as regulatory compliance, communication, and hazard identification 
(Geller, 1994). Tsay et al. (2014) cites social cognitive behavior theory (SCT) as 
demonstrating the relationship between safety culture and safety behavior. SCT 
(Wood & Bandura, 1989) emphasized that learning is achieved through 
observation of environment and occurs within the social context. The theory is 
closely aligned to the concept of reciprocal causation, “behavior, cognitive, and 
other personal factors and environmental events operate as interacting 
determinants that influence each other bi-directionally ” (para 1). Individuals, their 
behavior, and the environment influence each other reciprocally.  
According to Parker, Lawrie, and Hudson (2006), a positive safety culture 
can reduce accidents in an organization by emphasizing that ‘social forces’ act 
upon members of an organization (p. 2). Lack of a strong, positive, social force 
may lead to unsafe behavior. Hudson (2007) attributes the lack of a positive 
safety organizational culture as the main cause of accidents such as the space 
shuttle Columbia accident (NASA, 2003). Parker et al. (2006) further affirms that 
developing a more robust organizational safety culture may have more positive 
implications on aviation safety compared to enhanced supervision or tougher 







Parker et al. (2006) echoes Reason’s (2000) position on the effect of 
safety culture on behavior, but warned the influence of an organization’s safety 
culture eventually plateaus. To avoid the plateauing effect, organizations have to 
regularly capture employee feedback and revaluate remedial measures (Lee, 
1998; Taylor, 2012). Employee feedback regarding their perception of the safety 
culture and values may be a strong indicator of their likely behavior towards 
safety related considerations. Feedback that reflects employee perceptions may 
be a strong indicator of likely employee behavior towards safety related 
considerations. The current study evaluated employee perception of 
organizational safety culture as an assessment of safety standing and culture in 
the subject organization.  
Due to the complexities of modern organizations, the rate of development 
of safety culture is likely to vary between groups or sections of an organization 
(Parker et al., 2006). Considerations for professional cultures (Helmreich & Merrit, 
2001) related to safety are also important. As such, cross-sectional safety 
assessments involving departments and groups in an organization may enhance 
thorough evaluation of an organization’s safety standing. Such evaluation may 
allow mitigation measures to be customized to specific departmental and/or 
group needs. The current study included a cross-sectional design to investigate 
possible inter-departmental differences and professional cultural variances. The 
study also investigated differences in safety perceptions between front-line 







This study proposed to investigate the airline’s organizational safety 
climate by assessing the five basic elements/characteristics of an organizational 
safety culture as defined by Reason (1997). These are: 
 an informed culture-one in which those who manage and operate 
the system have current knowledge about the human, technical, 
organizational and environmental factors that determine the safety 
of the system as a whole,  
 a reporting culture: a culture in which people are willing to report 
errors and near misses,  
  a just culture: a culture of 'no blame' where an atmosphere of trust 
is present and people are encouraged or even rewarded for 
providing essential safety-related information- but where there is 
also a clear line between acceptable and unacceptable behavior  
 a flexible culture which can take different forms but is characterized 
as shifting from the conventional hierarchical mode to a flatter 
professional structure. 
 a learning culture - the willingness and the competence to draw the 
right conclusions from its safety information system, and the will to 
implement major reforms when the need is indicated (p. 8-2 – 8-3).  
Taylor (2012) also proposes that high-hazard low-risk disciplines have a 
“broadly agreed good safety culture practice characteristics” (p. 132). These five 
safety culture characteristics are: 







B. Leadership for safety is clear 
C. Accountability for safety is clear 
D. Safety is intergraded into all activities  
E. Safety is learning-driven   
These general characteristics form a benchmark of these industries with 
subtle variations depending upon the emphasis placed by a particular 
researcher (Taylor, 2012, p. 132). 
2.7 Perceptions and Safety  
Crutchfield and Roughton (2013) describe perception as a factor of safety 
culture. Perceptions of safety extend beyond the opinions of how the 
management and employees handle safety. It includes past perceptions, past 
style of management, approach to safety, priority given to safety, and nature of 
communication concerning safety related matters. Understanding the current 
organizational perceptions of safety is essential to any safety improvement 
measures including efforts to shape safety culture. An important aspect of 
perception is its dynamic nature, which calls for constant reviews (Crutchfield & 
Roughton, 2013; Gerede, 2014; Parker et al., 2006; Reason 1998).  
2.8 Safety Framework in Organizations 
An ideal safety environment operates on the premise of commitment to 
safety policies, procedures, and practices by all members of an organization. An 







expectations related to safety. Additionally, the organization ought to have a 
vigorous and healthy hierarchical and psychological platforms and relationships 
that support the five characteristics of safety culture as defined by Reason (1997).  
Tsay et al. (2014) stressed the importance of a well-defined organizational 
structure and its role in the safety management process. While developing a 
safety culture evaluation tool for a commercial airline, Tsay et al. (2014) 
presented a human-factors centered organizational safety culture assessment 
model. His overall model consisted of four levels: organizational system, 
executive, immediate supervisors, and staff. Taylor (2012) took a similar position 
to Tsay et al. (2014) regarding the role of organizational hierarchy in the 
management of safety. Taylor recognized organizational hierarchy as a 
significant factor of influence in safety culture. He defines the four organizational 
hierarchies as executives and senior managers, middle managers, supervisors, 
and the workforce team. Tsay et al.’s (2014) organizational system was further 
categorized to include safety policy, safety management system, and 
organizational resources and functionality.  
An organization’s management component consists of top and immediate 
management. The top management, also known as executives, are viewed as 
responsible for, and assessed from the viewpoint of their commitment to safety. 
In their HFACS model, Shappell and Wiegmann’s (2000) noted that top 
managers are responsible for, among other variables, Organizational Influences 
that include safety climate and safety culture. Tsay et al. (2014) emphasized 







based on their activities related to safety and their attitudes. This observation 
also parallels Shappell and Wiegmann’s (2000) HFACS model in reference to the 
level of Unsafe Supervision. Staff members are evaluated for their attitude 
towards safety and on their safety-related communication with their colleagues 
and with their superiors (Tsay et al. 2014). Liou et al. (2008) and Reason (2009) 
note that front-line employees are critical to airline operational safety. They form 
the last line of defense in a system. As such, they are equally critical in 
implementing and reevaluating safety management programs. It is also 
paramount that front-line employees adhere to the organization’s safety 
philosophy. Equally important, is the support front-line employees receive from 
management, as well as that which they provide to the management through the 
various safety reporting channels. Feedback should be efficiently received, 
captured, and appropriately acted upon (Liou et al., 2008). A positive safety 
culture is essential for effecting their roles.  
In a positive safety culture, information flows both top-down and bottom-up. 
A poor safety culture would customarily feature a predominantly top-down 
communication model. A comprehensive organizational safety culture 
assessment encompasses all employee levels in an organization for a more 
elaborate analysis. SMS is designed to optimize organizational hierarchies with 
defined roles and responsibilities to facilitate a smooth systematic management 







2.9 Safety Management Systems 
The Safety Management System (SMS) is a well-structured top-down 
comprehensive approach to identifying and managing risk in an organization 
(GAO, 2014; ICAO, 2009). Rather than establishing a separate safety system, 
SMS intends to integrate systematic procedures, policies, and practices within 
existing safety structures.  Ayres et al. (2009) identified two main purposes of 
SMS as “… to reduce safety risk for passengers, aircraft, personnel, and property 
to a level as low as reasonably practical (ALARP)…” (p. 28) and to aid 
management in balancing operational volume, safety, and cost. Rose (2006) 
provides the most comprehensive objective of SMS, as attaining an 
organizational safety culture that continually nurtures positive safety behavior 
such as safety reporting.  
According to Ayres et al. (2009), SMS carries with it many benefits, 
including: 
 Reduced likelihood of accidents 
 Reduced costs relating to accidents and incidents  
 Assurances that a systematic process of monitoring and addressing 
safety issues, in a transparent and informed way, is in place 
 The potential for reduced insurance and liability costs 
 Competitive advantage and possibility of more business 
opportunities  







According to Stolzer et al. (2008), “SMSs provide organizations with a 
powerful framework of safety philosophy, tools, and methodologies that improve 
their ability to understand, construct, and manage proactive safety systems” (p. 
1). SMS presents the latest method of approach to safety management that 
focuses more on organizational aspects of safety. Predecessor approaches of 
managing safety have focused on areas including engineering/technical and 
human aspects of safety.   
ICAO currently requires its 191 member states to implement SMS 
(Mourino, 2007). The implementation is directed under Annexes such as Annex 6 
– Operation of Aircraft, Annex 14 – Aerodrome, and Annex 11 Air Traffic 
Services. Under ICAO directives, international carriers and international airports 
are required to establish and practice SMS. State regulators such as the FAA 
encourage other sectors of aviation such as flight training to adopt SMS. The 
FAA (2015b) requires “most U.S. commercial airlines” (para. 1) to establish SMS 
by 2018. The success of SMS has led to its employment in industries such as 
energy and healthcare.  
This study focuses on non-engineering areas of safety such as 
organizational culture, risk management, and decision theory in aviation that are 
well represented in SMS. The study examines employee perceptions of safety 
culture as an indicator of safety behavior, and of the subject airline’s 








2.9.1 Components of a Safety Management System  
While SMS is practiced in many parts of the world (Mourino, 2007), there 
are variations in the approach to SMS design (Chen & Chen, 2011). ICAO’s 
(2013) SMS model has four components with 13 elements. The four components 
are Safety policy and objective, Safety risk management, Safety assurance, and 
Safety promotion. The SMS guiding principle issued by Transport Canada (2008) 
has six key components: Safety management plan; Documentation; Safety 
planning, Safety oversight, Training; and Quality assurance program.  
Other SMS models include that of the United Kingdom Civil Aviation 
Authority (UKCAA, 2010) that has 11 components and that of the Australian Civil 
Aviation Safety Authority (CASA, 2005) that has eight key elements. These 
variations may provide some challenges when implementing the chosen SMS 
model. The current study recognized components of SMS as defined by the FAA 
(2015). The components are Safety policy, Safety risk management, Safety 









Figure 5. Components of SMS as defined by FAA (2015) 
From “Safety Management System SMS explained” by FAA, 2015 
 
According to FAA (2015), Safety Risk Management (SRM) and Safety Assurance 
(SA) are the most important elements of SMS and the most interactive as 
depicted in figure 6.  
 
Figure 6. Interaction between SRM and SA (FAA, 2015) 








The Safety Risk Management identifies a hazard and performs a risk 
assessment. Appropriate risk controls are determined and applied. Safety 
assurance assesses the effectiveness of the risk control measures put in place. 
The relationship between Safety Risk Management and Safety Assurance 
underscores the need for a sound organizational structure with thorough 
authority, effective flow of information, accountabilities, as well as documentation 
and procedures. In addition to the four identified elements, there is an additional 
“…intangible, but always critical, aspect called safety culture” (FAA, 2015, para. 
2).  
While SMS is a robust safety management program (FAA, 2015; GAO, 
2014; ICAO, 2009) and has been effective (Ayres et al., 2009), scholars have 
addressed safety culture as a significant variable in the effectiveness of any 
safety program (IATA, 2011; Lewis, 2008). This is especially so given the 
dynamic nature of culture and the operational environment of the aviation 
industry (Taylor, 2012). They dynamic nature of culture demands that it be 
assessed regularly for nurturing and sustaining a positive safety culture. Likewise, 
there is need to understand the aviation operational environment as a factor of 
implementing a robust safety program.  
  
2.9.2 Aviation Operational Environment 
The aviation industry consists of many systems that have to interact 
together seamlessly for efficiency, cost effectiveness, and for safe operations. 







regulations. Wilke (2013) examined one such operational environment, the 
airport. Wilke (2013) described airports as “…complex systems involving the 
continuous interaction of human operators with the physical infrastructure, 
technology and procedures to ensure the safe and efficient conduct of flights” (p. 
4). For instance, airport runway and taxiway operations need to balance the 
needs of five major airport stakeholders: pilots, airport operators, air traffic control, 
regulations, and ground handling. The complexity of the interaction of 
stakeholders could result in a major risk of critical failure in one of the 
stakeholders. Besides the infrastructural and process elements of aviation 
operations, human factors remain a key consideration for safety. For instance, 
aviation personnel are affected by the physical, psychological, and physiological 
factors that occur in their work environment (Wilke, 2013).    
Johnson, Mason, Hall, and Watson (2001) underscore the effect of fatigue 
on aviation safety, especially as it pertains to three safety critical groups: pilots, 
air traffic controllers (ATC), and maintenance technicians. However, while the 
physical working conditions of pilots and ATC are fairly comfortable and uniform, 
maintenance technicians’ work environment varies considerably with time. 
Maintenance technicians can be subjected to adverse working conditions such 
as extreme temperatures, poor ventilation, and varying moisture. Maintenance 
technicians may also work in small spaces that limit natural body movements. 
Lack of sufficient sleep, extreme temperatures, noise, and poor lighting are some 







maintenance technician. Such working conditions can increase fatigue that can 
cause or contribute to latent unsafe conditions (Johnson et al., 2001). 
Harris (2011) presents some of the physiological and physical stressors of 
pilots. Physical stressors are environmental factors such as vibration, noise, 
disorientation, and humidity that can “severely affect the ability of pilots to 
perform all tasks, such as decision making and aircraft control” (p. 160). 
Physiological elements such as stress and fatigue can be common in aviation 
personnel due to stressful working conditions, high workload, time pressure, and 
personal life factors. While some employees may have a higher threshold of 
stress, others may resort to less desirable coping methods such as use of 
alcohol, which may increase operational safety risks (Harris, 2011). 
 
2.9.3 Factors of Implementing SMS  
The benefits of SMS have been documented (FAA, 2015) and efforts are 
underway to mandate and/or promote SMS in aviation communities across the 
world (Chen & Chen, 2011; Maurino, 2007). Various factors affect the effective 
implementation of SMS programs such as the style of implementation. The role 
of safety culture as a significant variable in the successful implementation and 
management of SMS has been broadly explored (FAA, 2014; Liou et al., 2008; 
Taylor, 2012). All measures considered, Reason (1998) argues that, generally, 
persuasion not as effective in instituting organizational changes necessary for the 
effective implementation of SMS, but action and performance, supported by 







Overall, SMS elements should be integrated seamlessly into an employee’s 
daily activities for smooth transition into the SMS program (Chen & Chen, 2011). 
Similarly, while the SMS architecture can be large and complex, ICAO (2013) 
and the FAA (2015) point out the scalability of SMS. Scalability allows 
organizations to customize the implementation and management of SMS to their 
sizes, resources, and needs.  
The roles of organizational hierarchy from top managers to front-line 
employees have received much attention in the literature (Gill & Shergill, 2004; 
Stolzer et al., 2008, 2011; Taylor, 2012). These roles include cultivating a 
positive safety culture, allocating necessary resources to support SMS programs, 
and providing feedback upwards as well downwards. Accountabilities of job 
functions, duties, actions, and tasks should be clearly specified across the 
organizational hierarchy. While group efforts are essential to promoting SMS, 
Pearse, Gallagher, and Bluff (2001) and Taylor (2012) stress the significance of 
one’s influence in the organization, as well as the level of networking one has, as 
key to effecting change.  
   One of the main challenges in implementing SMS is the lack of uniformity 
among the available SMS models (CASA, 2005; FAA, 2015; ICAO, 2013; 
Transport Canada, 2008; UKCAA, 2010). The different models may pose 
organizational and operational compatibility concerns as organizations operate in 
shared environments. From an organizational point of view, culture itself can be a 
hindrance to the required change. Nieva and Sorra (2003) point out that 







“individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns 
of behavior” (p. ii18). As such, multiple intervention approaches such as training 
and safety promotion are vital to transforming an organization to function as a 
high-reliability organization. Similarly, an enabling spirit for change plays a 
significant role in developing and sustaining a positive safety culture (Nieva & 
Sorra, 2003). Incidentally, Taylor (2012) warns of attempts to completely change 
an organization’s culture. Instead, gradual changes with periodic reevaluation of 
the culture would be a more successful approach (Taylor, 2012). 
 Stolzer et al (2008) underscore the importance of change management in 
the effectiveness of SMS by stating, “Without the commitment to effective safety 
change management, no other aspect of SMS matters, regardless of how well-
developed it might be” (p. 253). Stolzer et al. call for clarity and importance of the 
elements of SMS as well as a passionate commitment to the management of the 
change process. Ultimately, an SMS champion is key to leading the SMS 
implementation efforts. The champion should be appointed, supported, and 
empowered by the top management to be able to solicit necessary support and 
influence from other stakeholders in the organization to effect change (Stolzer et 
al., 2008).  
2.10 Previous Studies 
Scholars have explored aspects of organizational climate and safety culture 
(FAA, 2012; Piece at al., 2009; von Thaden et al., 2003). An overarching theme 







(Adjekum 2015; Rose, 2006; Vick, 2002). Vick (2002) describes safety an 
abstract concept, and as such, difficult to objectively quantify. Rose (2006) 
proposed conceptualization and standardization of analyzing human-factored 
and organizationally related safety methods. Nevertheless, both quantitative and 
qualitative methods have been proposed as ideal for conducting safety culture 
studies (Wreathall, 1995).  
Scholars have developed safety culture and safety climate assessment 
tools based on these methods. The tools include surveys, interviews, 
questionnaires, and checklists (Gao et al., 2015; Gibbons et al., 2006; HSE, 2005; 
von Thaden et al., 2003). A common limitation of earlier, human-centered safety 
assessment toolkits, is that they were mostly self-assessment questionnaires, 
and as such, could only measure attitudes, perceptions, and opinions. Concerns 
about standardization and validity of research tools have also been noted 
(Adjekum, 2015; Gibbons 2009; Liou, Tzeng, & Chang, 2007). Nevertheless, 
researchers have successfully carried out studies related to safety culture in 
industries including aviation and medicine, with improved validity. Often, 
researchers have developed their own research tools, or modified and validated 
existing tools (Tsay et al., 2014).  
Tsay et al. (2014) developed a safety cultural assessment survey tool 
customized to the operational needs of China Airlines (CAL). The researchers 
developed the survey in consultation with CAL and other aviation industry 
experts. The questions developed were based on two criteria, level of employee, 







included staff, immediate supervisor, and executive. Elements of SMS were 
divided among employee ranks based on their respective roles and 
responsibilities resulted in seven categories. The categories included safety 
policy, safety management system, safety policy, safety commitment of top 
managers, safety commitment by immediate supervisors, safety attitude and 
communication, and safety perception. Demographic information included the 
level of seniority and age. While the safety analysis tool met reliability and validity 
requirements, a notable limitation was its inability to identify weakness factors in 
the airline’s safety culture. Recommendations included use of focus groups in 
subsequent applications (Tsay et al., 2014).    
Earlier, Zohar (1980) had examined safety perceptions in the construction 
industry. The researcher observed uniformity among groups as well as variation 
across groups. This observation aligns with the concept of a professional-specific 
culture within an organization as presented by Helmreich (1998). Cox and Cox 
(1991) examined attitudes shared between employees that guided their 
perceptions and behavior towards safety. Participants were employees of a 
European company represented across several countries, occupation, and 
occupation level. Researchers identified “…personal skepticism, individual 
responsibility, the safeness of the work environment, the effectiveness of 
arrangements for safety, and personal immunity” (Cox & Cox, 1991, p. 93) as 
significant variables of attitude towards safety.  
Gao, Bruce, and Rajendran (2015) conducted a cross-sectional safety 







flight engineers/maintenance, cabin crew, and ground/network operators. The 
researchers observed an overall positive perception of the safety climate among 
all employees. In addition, employment history appeared to be a factor of safety 
climate across the groups. Junior employees indicated a higher positive 
perception of the safety culture compared to seniors. This observation mirrored 
similar findings by Gao et al. (2013) and Adjekum et al. (2015) who 
recommended additional investigation of seniority as a factor of safety reporting. 
In addition, the ground crew operators appeared to perceive safety culture more 
positively, followed by the cabin crew group. Pilots reported the least 
perceptiveness of the airline’s safety climate. The finding indicated more defined 
organizational sub-cultures, aligned closely with the line of work. Gao et al. (2015) 
recommended replicating the study with other airlines to test for generalizability 
of their findings. Like Taylor (2012), the researchers also recommended 
longitudinal studies to investigate the effect of the dynamism of policies, practices, 
and procedures on perception of safety (Gao, Bruce, & Rajendran (2015). 
One such longitudinal study was carried out by Varjavand, Bachegowda, 
Gracely, and Novack (2012). Their study investigated the effect of increased risk-
awareness on medical-error disclosures, a decade apart. Participants, medical 
interns at a university hospital, recorded an increased reporting by 33% and 26% 
for lower-risk and higher-risk error-incidents respectively at end of the test 
decade. Researchers attributed the improvements to new regulations, training, 
and change in attitudes as well as beliefs about error disclosures. Researchers 







and professional levels to test for validation and limitation of their study 
(Varjavand et al., 2012).   
Researchers are challenged to employ more elaborate research techniques 
such as incorporating interviews and document review in safety culture studies to 
facilitate deeper understanding of an organizations’ safety environment (HSE, 
2005). The ‘vertical slice’ method is also ideal for evaluating safety culture. The 
method assesses “operational workforce, supervisory levels as well as 
management and strategic thinking in order to identify if the right information, 
norms, and values are being communicated down the hierarchy” (HSE, 2005, p. 
38). The vertical slice method allows for determining whether down-up 
communication exits in an organization (HSE, 2005). The current study applied 
the vertical slice assessment tool to investigate the seamlessness of perception 
of safety between the front-line employees and the management.  
2.11 Summary  
Chapter 2 reviewed previous studies related to the current research. It 
explored the concept of safety culture, safety climate, and discussed factors of 
organizational safety culture. In addition, this chapter discussed safety 
management systems, highlighted safety framework in organizations, and 
explored the relationship between the perception of safety culture and 
organizational behavior. The next chapter will address the research design as 







CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY  
3.1  Research Design 
 Researchers (Gibbons et al., 2006; Hennink, 2014) have recommended a 
mixed method for safety culture studies. This research employed a cross-
sectional mixed method design. Data collection techniques used in the study 
were on-line survey, semi-structured interviews, and focus group activities. 
Safety climate surveys are the most popular tools for assessing safety climate 
while qualitative data capture techniques such as interviews and focus groups 
are ideal for assessing an organization’s safety culture (Hennink, 2014; Patankar 
et al., 2012).  
The first two phases of the current study were an on-line survey and 
interviews. The survey had quantitative and qualitative components. The 
researcher utilized the quantitative segment of the survey as a tool for capturing 
the safety climate-related and SMS-related data. Safety climate data pertained to 
research questions one and four, while SMS data were pertained to research 
question two of the current study. The qualitative segment of the survey, as well 
as the interview and focus group activity, captured data useful to assessing the 







 The researcher analyzed results from the interview and the qualitative 
segment of the survey to identify common themes of interest that the researcher 
explored further by a focus group activity. Table 5 summarizes the design for this 
study. 
 
Table 5 Summary of Study Design and Analysis 
 
 
3.1.1 Quantitative Method 
Quantitative methods can be used to evaluate the relationships between 
dependent and independent variables. Descriptive, experimental, and 
correlational research designs are usually carried out quantitatively. The 
quantitative segment of this study was descriptive and correlational. Researchers 
used the quantitative methods to assess, understand, and describe the safety 
climate of the subject airline. Quantitative method is also intended to evaluate 
any Key relationships between variables such as cross-groups perceptions. 
 According to Rousseau (1990), quantitative methods are ideal for 




investigated Data collection Design and method Tools
1 Safety climate Survey - quantitative 
segment
Descriptive  cross-
sectional quantitative Kruskal-Wallis H Test
2 SMS
Survey - quantitative 
segment
Descriptive  cross-
sectional quantitative Kruskal-Wallis H Test
Survey - qualitative 
segment Explorative qualitative Thematic analysis 
Interview Explorative qualitative Thematic analysis 
Focus group Explorative qualitative Thematic analysis 
4 Safety climate
Survey - quantitative 
segment
Descriptive  cross-








and respond to the similar stimuli within defined parameters. The standard stimuli 
may be presented to participants through various ways. For instance, similar 
questions can be presented to participants through forms and media such as 
online questionnaires or interviews. Presenting a standard stimulus to 
participants allows a similar base from which respondents can be evaluated 
(Rousseau, 1990). The qualitative methods in this study were represented by the 
survey.   
3.1.2 Qualitative Method 
Wreathall (1995) identifies a major concern regarding quantitative research 
design as its limited ability to offer in-depth understanding of results. Qualitative 
methods allow for respondents’ objective interpretations of experiences and 
meanings through words and images. The methods can also aid researchers to 
understand the meaning behind responses generated by the stimuli presented 
during a qualitative process. Other advantages include flexibility of research, 
ability to develop new theories, and ability to understand complex inquiry 
(Wreathall, 1995).  
Creswell (2009) identifies four methods of qualitative data collection as 
observations, interviews, documents, and audiovisual. Several observation 
techniques exist which contain varying degrees of participation and observation 
by both researcher and participant. While observation allows researcher firsthand 
knowledge with participants, significant limitations include privacy concerns and 
challenges related to working with children. Interviews can be conducted face-to-







indirectly, which may affect authenticity of the responses and results. 
Researchers’ biases may also affect how interviews are conducted as well as 
results. The Document technique involves collecting documents, public or private, 
such as diaries and newspapers (Creswell, 2009).  
The document technique may offer some flexibility to researchers 
compared to methods like interviews (Creswell, 2009). For instance, publicly 
available documents may be easier to access and may present fewer privacy 
challenges than interview techniques. The technique captures data in 
participants’ own language, which may improve the directness of the data. One 
of the limiting aspects of document technique is the potential for inaccurate or 
unauthentic data due to reasons such as presenter’s own biases. A researcher 
may also have to transcribe or process data further, for usability, by methods 
such as scanning which adds the workload and potential limitations pertinent to 
transcribing. Audiovisual material includes sources such as films, art objects, and 
photographs. Audiovisual materials can be imaginative, allowing “participants to 
directly share their reality” (p. 187). Nonetheless, they may be difficult to interpret, 
as well as not being readily available in the public domain (Creswell, 2009). 
Berg et al. (2004) point out that unlike structured interviews that only 
capture fixed responses from participants, semi-structured interviews present 
predetermined open-ended questions that allow for in-depth follow-up on 
questions and topics. Unstructured interviews have no standard defined 
questions. Instead, unstructured interviews offer more flexibility to both 







group activities also provide similar in-depth understanding of themes and topics 
(Berg, Lawrence, & Lune, 2004).  
This study employed focus groups and semi-structured interviews as 
techniques to capture qualitative data.  
 
3.1.3 Cross-Sectional Design  
A Cross-Sectional design is ideal for indicating how responses are 
represented across a study population (Creswell, 2009). Surveys are ideal for 
capturing data in cross-sectional study. Limitations of this design include difficulty 
in measuring change, as the study only performs a time snap shot of the 
variables in question. A longitudinal study may allow for trend analysis. Cross-
Sectional analysis does not account for the effect of confounding variables. 
Additionally, it is unable to demonstrate cause and effect. The current study 
evaluated front-line employees including pilots, flight attendants, maintenance, 
and dispatch. It also evaluated the airline’s management team.  
 
3.1.4 Nominal Group Technique  
The nominal group technique (Harvey & Holmes, 2012) is effective in 
managing focus group members’ participation. Nominal group technique enables 
individuals to first, silently, write their ideas of a piece of paper. The papers are 
then pinned on a board, grouped together in similarity of opinion, ideas, or 
answers. Participants then discuss identified ideas regardless of who presented 







members. It checks dominance by some members and/or fear of participation by 
others. In addition to using nominal group technique, this study applied a cross-
sectional design.  
3.2 Study Survey 
This study used survey as one of the three phases of the study. Other 
phases were interviews and focus group activities. The survey tool captured data 
to investigate the safety culture, SMS, and safety climate of the subject airline.   
 
3.2.1 Survey Structure  
The survey used in this study consisted of four sections. The sections were 
salutation, demographics, structured questions, and open-ended question 
section. The salutation section educated participants about the study, and invited 
them to participate. It also informed participants’ rights regarding the study and 
about the informed consent. The demographics section requested and captured 
participants’ demographic information, such as age-range, the number of years a 
participant had worked at the airline, and participant’s gender.  
The third section contained structured questions that collected data 
pertaining to employee perception of the subject airline’s safety climate. The 
dimension safety climate elements assessed in the currently study were 
Managements’ commitment to safety, Management’s Action, and Perceived 
employee (Flint et al., 2000; Patankar et al., Seo et al., 2004; 2012; Zohar, 2000). 







pillars of safety management system according to FAA (2015). The pillars were 
Safety policy, Safety assurance, Quality assurance, and Safety promotion. 
Questions in this section also solicited feedback on respondents’ perceptions of 
management’s approach to managing the subject airline’s safety. Each of the 
total seven elements under investigation (three dimensions of safety climate and 
four pillars of SMS) in the third section on the survey was represented by 
between, and including, three and seven questions. Some questions 
transcended to more than one element.  
The questions in the third section of the questionnaire were presented in a 
5-point scale Likert format. The 5-point scale items were: ‘Strongly Disagree’, 
‘Disagree’, ‘Neither Agree nor Disagree’, ‘Agree’, and ‘Strongly Agree’. These 
scale items were covariates in the quantitative research segment of this study. 
For this study, the highest and most positive value was ‘Strongly Agree’ and 
‘Strongly Disagree’, the lowest. The researcher worded some questions such that 
‘Strongly Disagree’ would be the most desirable option in ideal application and 
‘Strongly Disagree’ the least desirable option. This change was done to check for 
internal consistency within the scale items. Concerns pertaining to Likert scales 
have been explored with conflicting opinions about the number of points of a 
scale and whether even-numbered or odd-numbered (Joshi, Kale, Chandel, & 
Pal, 2015). An odd-numbered Likert scale is viewed as providing more options to 
participants than an even-scaled Likert (Joshi et al., 2015). However, Tsay et al. 
(2014) argue that a 6-point scale, which is even, is useful in eliminating “…the 







when compared to an odd-numbered Likert scale. Regarding the comparison 
between a 5-point and a 7-point scale, the latter is viewed as providing more 
options to a participant, thus measuring a construct more accurately (Joshi, 
2015). While the options of the number of point-scale may have psychological 
effects of the choices made by participants of the scale, the effect is minimal 
(Wakita, Ueshima, & Noguchi, 2012).  
The last section had a provision that solicited and allowed participants to 
record any additional information or comments regarding the study. This 
captured information provided qualitative data to complement quantitative entries 
in the questionnaire. 
 
3.2.2 Survey development  
The challenges faced by researchers conducting safety culture studies, 
related to availability of research tools as well as the validity of the research tools, 
have been broadly discussed (Adjekum 2015). The current study used a survey 
modified from that of Tsay at al. (2014) and Gao et al. (2015). The current study 
slightly mirrors the preceding studies by Tsay et al. (2014) and Gao et al. (2015). 
Additionally, surveys used in both studies were validated in their respective 
studies.  
A list of survey items were drawn from both surveys and considered for 
the two sub-sections of the quantitative survey under the three perceptions or 
dimensions of safety climate (Dedobbeleer & Béland, 1991; Flint et al., 2000; 







(FAA, 2015). The list of questions underwent a further validation process. Subject 
experts including human factors researchers, industry professionals, professors 
in the aviation safety discipline, and an employee in the safety department from 
the subject company, provided feedback. The final list of the quantitative 
questions contained 20 questions, covering the three perceptions of safety 
climate and the four pillars of SMS.  
Surveys have advantages such as multiple channels of delivery, including 
online, in person, and over the telephone. Surveys can be easy to analyze and 
some, like web-based, economical to carry out. However, there is likelihood that 
participants will provide inaccurate feedback through surveys. Surveys may also 
experience a low response rate (Aaron, 2012). This survey was administered 
online and used techniques that were aimed at increasing the response rate such 
as extending the live time for the survey. The survey was also administered 
through two media, the subject company’s Intranet and the monthly newsletter.    
3.3 Interview  
This study employed semi-structured interviews to capture data from nine 
participants. Interview was one of the three phases of the study. The interview 
phase sought to assess respondents’ general perceptions of the overall 
organizational safety, safety culture, and safety climate. The semi-structured 
Interviews had 10 key questions. The interviews were conducted over the 
telephone and audio recorded. The interview questions underwent a validation 







3.4 Focus Group Activities 
Kamberelis and Dimitriadis (p. 299, 2005), describe focus groups as 
“…form of group interviews that capitalizes on communication between research 
participants in order to generate data”. The focus group technique is seldom 
used as a stand-alone technique and is recommended as part of a mixed method 
approach to a study (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2005), usually in a support role to 
a primary technique such as survey (Hennink, 2014; NOAA, 2009). This method 
helps to interpret results from the primary source.  Scholars contend that focus 
groups are not intended to garner consensus, but to better understand the 
research topic by generating a wide range of relevant views (Hennink, 2014; 
NOAA, 2009). When applied correctly, a focus group may discriminate less 
against participants who cannot read or those who cannot write compared to 
methods such as online surveys (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2005). Participants 
who would be hesitant to be interviewed individually may also be encouraged to 
participate in focus groups, as it may appear to be comparatively less intrusive.   
Like other data collection techniques, focus groups have disadvantages. 
They include potential reluctance by some participants to participate in 
discussion because they are shy or due to fear of punitive consequences 
(Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2005); possible dominant participants, focus group 
activities require a less controlled environment (Hennink, 2014); and possible 
polarization of participants by the moderator (NOAA, 2009). As suggested by 
NOAA (2009) this study selected members of the same peer group to create a 







group activities were conducted in two separate groups based on seniority: front 
line employee and managers. When not properly moderated, some participants 
may dominate the focus group sessions (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2005, p. 299). 
To address for time limitation, this study presented 12 questions for discussion, 
well within the 12 to 15 questions for an hour session of focus group 
recommended by Hennink (2014).  
The size of a focus group is also critical in the success and productivity of a 
focus group session. A group’s size should be “small enough for everyone to 
have an opportunity to share insights and yet large enough to provide diversity of 
perceptions” (Kruger & Casey, 2000, p. 10). Scholars have suggested group size 
ranges of between, and including, five and 12 participants per group (Hennink, 
2014; NOAA, 2009). Hennink (2014) however suggests the nature of a study 
topic and type of research should have significant influence on the size of a focus 
group. For example, a narrower-topic and specific-research study could utilize a 
smaller-sized focus group than wider-topic and exploratory-type study. Following 
the stipulated guidance, this study utilized eight participants for the focus group 
activity.  
3.5  Study Population 
The airline investigated under this study is a US-based regional passenger 
airline. The airline has several divisions and operates from multiple locations in 
the US. The subject airline’s front-line employee groups, pilots, maintenance 







study, as well as the subject airline’s management. The subject airline was 
selected for ease of access by the researcher. Participants had to be at least 18 
years of age, and at the time, current employees of the subject airline.  
3.6 Sampling Design  
Sampling is the technique used to select subjects from a population for 
study (Dattalo, 2008). Quantitative sampling purposes to obtain a sample that 
has a fair representation of the population (Creswell, 2009). Due to factors such 
as logistics, finance, and labor, researchers use samples to study populations. 
To improve the accuracy of a study and its generalizability to the population or 
other groups, a sample should fairly represent a study population (Dattalo, 2008). 
A sample design determines the fairness and representativeness of a sample to 
a population. It addresses how participants are selected into a sample as well as 
the sample size (Dattalo, 2008). 
Probability sampling accords equal chances of selection to all members of a 
population into the sample (Dattalo, 2008). Simple, stratified, systematic, and 
cluster sampling are examples of probability sampling. Simple random sampling 
assigns numbers to participants in the population. A randomized technique such 
as a random number generator is used to select numbers that represent selected 
participants in the population. In systematic random sampling, a sequence is 
selected from a list of the participants of a population, based on the population’s 
size and required sample size. Stratified sampling is ideal when there is need for 







applied stratified sampling in the interview and focus group phases of the study. 
The methods ensured equal representation of participants across the studied 
groups. Cluster sampling allows sampling from a large population or a large 
geographical area. Cluster sampling is very cost effective. However, within large 
clusters, participants from within the cluster have much lower probability of being 
selected. The probability proportionate to size (PPS) technique can reduce this 
error. This study employed cluster sampling in the survey part of the study. The 
survey was accessible to the entire population (Dattalo, 2008).  
Nonprobability sampling is an alternative sampling design (Dattalo, 2008). 
Nonprobability sampling addresses some of the challenges common to 
probability sampling such as ethical concerns, cost, and time. However, 
nonprobability sampling grants unknown chance of selection to all participants of 
a population. This study employed purposeful sampling in the interview and focus 
group phases of the study. In purposeful sampling, the researcher targets 
participants in the population that would best serve the study’s goals. For 
example, a researcher may select participants who are well knowledgeable in the 
subject area of interest. The researcher has to have knowledge of elements of 
the population to use this sampling method. Other nonprobability sampling 
techniques include quota sampling and snowball sampling. Quota sampling is 
similar to stratified sampling except quota sampling is non-probabilistic and it 
warrants the sample “…represents certain characteristics in proportion to the 







recruit elements in the population. It is ideal when it is difficult to find suitable 
candidates (Dattalo, 2008).  
3.7 Sample Size 
According to Newey and McFadden (1994), the desired effect size, alpha, 
and beta values, determines a sample size. The alpha value defines type I error. 
With type I error, the research concludes to a false positive, or falsely concludes 
a treatment effect. Use of an alpha value of 0.05 is common in social sciences 
(Newey & McFadden, 1994). An alpha value of 0.05 limits the probability of 
committing type I error to 5%. The smaller the alpha value, the greater the 
sample size required. The power or beta value determines type II error. Type II 
error happens when a study falsely concludes there is no treatment effect while 
there indeed is one (Field, 2009). A beta value of 0.8 is common in social 
sciences (Newer & McFadden, 1994). A power of 0.8 gives the study an 
assumption that there is a probability of 80% that the study will find a treatment 
effect when one truly exists. The larger the sample size, the higher the power of 
a study. Nakagawa and Cuthill (2007) define effect size as “…a relevant 
interpretation of an estimated magnitude of an effect from the effect statistics” (p. 
594). Effect size of approximately 0.2 can be considered small, 0.5 medium, or 
0.8, large. The researcher of the current study used an alpha value of 0.05, and a 







3.8 Procedures, Administration, and Data Collection  
A physical meeting to discuss the intentions of the study was held between 
the researcher and safety managers of the subject airline. A verbal agreement 
that included a non-disclosure clause was entered between the two parties 
regarding this study. The study was carried out under the guidelines of Purdue’s 
Human Research Protection Program (HRPP).  The researcher obtained 
approval for the present study from Purdue’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
(see Appendix I). The study was conducted in three phases, online survey 
questionnaire, interviews, and focus group activities. An employee from the 
safety department of the subject company was the study’s ‘community 
gatekeeper’, a liaison between the researcher and participants, as need arose. 
Krueger and Casey (2000) underscore the importance of the role of community 
gatekeepers. Gatekeepers can aid with the recruitment of participants; facilitate 
access to the population of interest; and enable accessibility to trusted and valid 
participants. The researcher visited the subject airline for discussions about the 
study. The researcher made subsequent visits to the airline and maintained 
communication with the liaison throughout the period of the study.   
 
3.8.1 Survey 
An approval was sought (Appendix H) and obtained (Appendix I) from the 
researcher institution’s IRB regarding the final validated survey. A link leading to 
the online survey was posted on the subject airline’s monthly safety newsletters 







servers for reliability and privacy considerations. Data were also captured and 
stored on Qualtrics®. The survey link stayed live for a period of 12 weeks.    
3.8.2 Interviews  
The validated semi-structured interview questions were approved by 
Purdue’s IRB. The interviews were conducted over the telephone. The study 
liaison coordinated the purposeful and stratified samplings of participants by 
helping to identify potential participants in each of the studied groups that were 
knowledgeable in the subject areas of interest. Stratified sampling encouraged a 
fair representation across the groups being studied (Dattalo, 2008). The groups 
under this study were pilots, flight attendants, maintenance personnel, dispatch, 
and managers. Purposeful sampling made more likely that participants were 
knowledgeable in the study subject area (Dattalo, 2008). The purpose of the 
interviews was to assess general employee perception of safety at the subject 
airline. Interviews also allow for an in-depth understanding, reasoning, and 
meaning of themes and concerns identified by participants (Creswell, 2009).  
With the assistance of the liaison, the researcher recruited interview 
participants. The liaison forwarded the study’s information sheet (Appendix A) 
and a recruitment statement (Appendix B) to the participants. The information 
sheet educated the participants on a number of aspects of the study including its 
purpose, participants’ rights, and researcher’s contact information. The 
recruitment statement solicited participants’ participation to the study. It also 
informed them about participant’s anonymity, length of interview, and 







Some participants communicated to the researcher through email or 
telephone to set up the phone-interview appointment time. Participants were 
greeted at the beginning of the interview call. Participants were asked to 
acknowledge whether they had received and read the recruitment statement and 
the study information sheet. Participants were read the recruitment statement if 
they did not acknowledge receiving or reading a copy. A verbal consent for audio 
recording of the interview sessions was obtained from participants. A process for 
semi-structured interview was then carried out.    
 
3.8.3 Focus group session  
The study liaison coordinated the sampling and recruitment of the focus 
group activity. The recruitment procedures for focus group activity were similar to 
that of interviews. Participants to the focus group activity comprised of middle-
level managers. All four groups within the focus of this study were represented by 
participants. As suggested by Hennink (2014), the structure of the focus group 
activities entailed introduction, opening session, key topics, closing questions, 
and a post-discussion session.   
During the introduction session, the researcher and participants introduced 
themselves to each other for cognition. The aim of the introduction session was 
to develop familiarity among participants, between participants and the 
researcher, as well as to draw participants’ focus to the study. According to 
Hennink (2014), the opening session is vital in building good rapport between the 







researcher read an information sheet to participants. The script educated 
participants about important aspects pertaining to the study and their 
participation. Aspects contained in the script included the purpose of the study, 
ethical considerations, and expectations about confidentiality. Permission to 
audio-record the session was then obtained verbally from participants and 
followed by signed consent forms (Appendix E).  
Following introductory remarks were questions that focused on the key 
topics and themes of the study (Appendix G). These questions were designed to 
explore the common themes and topics identified from the analysis of results 
from the interview and survey segments of this study. The focus groups sessions 
were meant to provide comprehensive understanding of varying opinions across 
the studied groups. The key topics and specific questions segment of the focus 
group activities were essential in offering possible explanations to participants’ 
perceptions of the airline’s safety systems and their safety behavior. This 
information may be helpful to further improve the airline’s safety environment.      
As suggested by Hennink (2014), the closing questions were aimed to 
indicate a near end to a discussion group session. They also help to summarize 
items discussed, recap important elements identified during the discussion, and 
allow an opportunity for participants to suggest important messages and 







3.9 Data Preparation  
At the end of data the collection period, the online survey data were 
downloaded through a password-secured computer network system. A Microsoft 
Excel Spreadsheet was used to eliminate data entries that were incomplete. The 
researcher coded the responses with numerical values between and including 
one and five. For instance, all ‘Strongly Agree’ responses were coded as a 5, and 
all ‘Strongly Disagree’ responses were coded as 1. The study reverses the codes 
for questions that were asked in such a manner that, for example, a ‘Strongly 
Disagree’ response would have been a more positive response in regard to 
safety. Regarding the qualitative segments of this study, the researcher 
transcribed interviews and focus group with verbatim for analysis. According to 
Hennink (2014), verbatim is integral in presenting qualitative studies, especially 
focus group research, and with the thematic data analysis method. The 
researcher of the current study did not transcribe individually identifiable data, for 
privacy considerations.   
3.10 Data Analysis 
The researcher for this study used multiple data capture, preparation, and 
analysis and presentation methods pertinent to the type of data collected. For 
statistical analysis, the researcher used the Statistical Package for the Social 
Science (SPSS) version 43, a statistical software program. Reliability of the scale 
items were investigated using the Cronbach’s Alpha test. Stevens (2002) and 







indicator of an adequate internal consistency. Where applicable, a Bonferroni 
adjustment was performed to control for inflation of type I error Response 
To analyze qualitative data, the researcher of the current study employed a 
deductive reasoning approach. Referring to it as a bottom-up reasoning, Trochim 
(2006) describes deductive reasoning as one that begins with specific 
observations and develops to broader generalities and theories. According to 
Miles, Huberman, and Saldana (2013), a deductive theory starts with a 
researcher reading study transcripts to obtain a general impression of the 
responses. Transcripts are re-read one by one, line by line. Coding involves 
using a phrase or word to represent the overall message identified in recorded 
data such as transcripts, images, and documents (Miles, et al., 2013). 
 Transcripts were coded based on elements such as repeated words, 
phrases, and sentences; statements or ideas stated explicitly as important by 
participants; and data that aligned with known pertinent theories and/or concepts. 
All the codes were reevaluated, after which some were eliminated and the 
remainder joined into groups of common themes. The themes were defined 
either purely by what data suggested as well as per elements related to the 
research question such as the features of a positive safety culture (Reason, 1997) 
and four pillars of SMS (FAA, 2015).  
3.11 Validity  
This study employed a mixed-method approach to research. Validity is an 







the relationship between dependent and independent variables. Regarding 
qualitative research, Creswell (2009) defines internal threats as “…experimental 
procedures, treatments, or experiences of the participants that threaten 
researcher’s ability to draw correct inferences from the data in an experiment” (p. 
171). External validity is concerned with aspects that affect the generalizability of 
the study results to the population. Threats to external validity occur when “…a 
researcher generalizes beyond the groups in the experiment to other racial or 
social groups not under the study” (p. 171). Threats to a study’s validity have to 
be appropriately addressed (Creswell, 2009). 
 
3.11.1 Threats to Internal Validity  
Salkind (2009) identifies seven types of threats to internal validity: history, 
selection, regression, mortality, maturation, instrumentation, and testing.  
3.11.1.1 History 
Studies often take place over a certain duration. Within this time, internal or 
external elements may have a variation effect in participants’ responses. For 
instance, changes in policies related to the areas of the study may affect how 
participants respond to the study. Policies deemed favorable to positive safety 
culture may prompt more favorable responses regarding safety culture.  This 








Maturation refers to “changes caused by biological or psychological forces” 
(Salkind, 2009, p. 232). Maturation is concerned with changes occurring within 
participants rather than external factors. For example, a participant may gain full 
understanding regarding a particular safety reporting system after a lengthy study. 
When the said knowledge is gained within the period of the study, it may 
influence the participant’s responses related to the stated safety reporting system 
and likely threaten the study’s validity. The current study also limited the data 
collection time to help control maturation as an internal threat to the study’s 
validity.  
Nevertheless, a possible effect of maturation pertaining to the current study 
could have been the effect of the change of policy about the Fatigue Risk 
Management Program, one of the many safety management programs used by 
the subject airline. Data indicate that within the period of the current study, a 
policy was instituted by the subject airline’s management to disassociate habitual 
citation of pilots’ for Occurrences, pertaining to pilots’ use of the Fatigue 
Management Program. The said policy was put into effect after the completion of 
the survey and interview phases of the current study, but before the focus group 
session. Data also indicates a possible influence of the changes in question, to 








Selection refers to the influence that sampling and selection of participants 
may have on the results (Salkind, 2009). To reduce selection bias, a random 
selection and random assignment have to be performed. This study presented 
the survey to the population through online medium to minimize selection bias. 
The link to the survey was posted on the subject airline’s Intranet and monthly 
safety newsletters. The study assumed the two platforms were accessible by all 
employees.  
3.11.1.4 Testing 
Some aspects of research such as pre-tests can influence participants’ 
responses during a study (Salkind, 2009). This study did not employ such 
techniques. Equally, the researcher limited the number of the subject airline’s 
employees that participated in the survey validation process to three, to minimize 
testing as a threat to internal validity.  
3.11.1.5 Mortality  
Mortality refers to attrition of participants before they complete all the 
required steps in a study (Salkind, 2009). Studies should be voluntary and 
participants should have a right to withdraw at any time they want to do so. 
Participants have the right to be informed of these rights. To minimize mortality, 
this study presented a survey to participants that was optimized for minimum 
length but greatest effect to investigate the research question. There were design 







mobile devices and desktop computers to allow more flexibility to participants. 
The survey was designed for an estimated completion time of 10 minutes to 
minimize mortality as a threat to validity.  
3.11.1.6 Threats to internal qualitative validity  
Generally, generalizability is not a significant objective for qualitative 
research (Creswell, 2009). Focus group activities and interviews were the 
qualitative components of this study. Nevertheless, qualitative research is prone 
to other biases that affect validity and need to be addressed. The biases may 
include researcher biases such as tone of voice, age, and style of language that 
may have influence on participants’ perceptiveness and responses. This study 
made efforts to minimize chances of bias in the questions for the focus group 
activities and interview sessions towards certain aspects of the study. Some 
practices such as leading questions that suggest what the answers should be 
may also threaten the validity of the study (Creswell, 2009).  
Efforts to promote interval validity in the qualitative parts of the study 
included triangulation, as suggested by Cooper (2000). Triangulation refers to 
combining “multiple theories, methods, observers, and imperial materials, to 
produce a more accurate, comprehensive and objective representation of the 
object of study” (Silverman, 2011, p. 32). This study employed a mixed method 
approach as well as utilized interview, survey, and focus group as data capture 
techniques for triangulation purposes. The researcher also employed external 







included aviation safety subject matter experts, human factors researchers, 
industry professionals, and an employee in the safety department from the 
subject airlines. Efforts by external auditors included validation of the study’s 
related questions and procedures. Lastly, the researcher provided a detailed 
discussion regarding data that was in significant conflict among participants 
and/or across the three phases of study (Creswell, 2009).  
 
3.11.2 Threats to External Validity  
The four threats to external validity according to Salkind (2009) are 
multiple treatment inference, reactive arrangements, pre-test sensitization, and 
experimenter effects. These threats affect whether results may be applicable to 
other groups. This study considered external threats to validity regarding the 
quantitative/survey part of the study. 
3.11.2.1 Multiple treatment inference 
According to Salkind (2009), participants may be given additional stimuli 
or treatment, which may limit generalizability of results to the population or other 
groups. Additional treatments should be limited or well accounted for. A section 
of the survey solicited an open-ended response from participants. To control for 
multiple treatment inference, this question was processed in accordance with 
qualitative procedures as explained in the section above.  Regarding the semi-
structured interviews, responses and analysis to the follow-up questions were 







3.11.2.2 Reactive arrangements  
Salkind (2009) describes reactive arrangements as the change in 
participants’ behavior or responses due to the awareness that they are being 
watched or observed by researchers. This study did not employ an observation 
technique for data collection.    
3.11.2.3 Experimenter effects 
A researcher may influence, directly or indirectly, a participant’s response 
(Salkind, 2009). The researcher made effort to use clear language and a neutral 
style of writing on the survey to limit experimenter effect.   
3.12 Ethical Consideration 
Canella and Lincoln (2011) assert that proper ethical standards should be 
at the forefront of all human-centered research. Ethical research may be used as 
one of the measurements of a good research plan involving human subject 
(Hodges, 2011). The researcher of the current study obtained permission from 
the researcher’s institution’s IRB to conduct the current research (Appendix I). In 
addition, the researcher observed several measures to safeguard expected 
ethical standards.   
The researcher de-identified personal identified information from all 
captured data, to reduce the possibility of identifying participants, as suggested 
by Damianakis and Woodford (2012). The survey used for the current study 
instructed participants not to include any personal identifiable information in the 







identifiable information while transcribing recorded data from interviews and the 
focus group session. Additionally, the analysis and reporting of the current study 
was conducted in a manner optimal to participants’ and subject airline’s 
confidentiality and anonymity.  
Harrison and Rooney (2012) reiterate that human subject have several 
rights, including the right “to be properly and adequately informed about the 
nature, impact, and outcomes of the research and to consent to participation in 
the research” (p. 38). The procedure for the current study included measures to 
ensure participants were well informed about the purpose, impacts, and 
outcomes of the study, as well as sought informed consent of participation from 
student subjects. Interview and focus group participants were presented with 
information sheet (Appendix A) that contained information such as the purpose 
and implications of the study, as well as expectations regarding participants’’ 
privacy and confidentiality. The recruitments statements for both phases of the 
study contained similar information, as well as an informed consent clause.  
Interview and focus group activity participants were also presented with informed 
consent forms (Appendix E). The informed consent form contained information 
such as the purpose of the study, privacy expectations, and a request to record 
the session. 
In regard to sampling of participants for participants, the online survey was 
accessible through the subject airline’s intranet, which facilitated anonymity and 
discouraged participation due to undue influence. While the subject airline’s 







sampling, participants communicated directly to the researcher concerning any 
questions related to the study, as well as to confirm participation. This process 
allowed for more participants’ autonomy and voluntariness  
3.13 Summary 
Chapter 3 explored the methods and methodology adopted in the currently 
study. Aspects discussed in the chapter include the research design, study 
population, and study sample size. This chapter also discussed the questionnaire 
design, methods of data collection, data analysis, survey administration, and 
study procedures. Lastly, this chapter explored the study’s validity. The next 







CHAPTER 4. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the safety culture and safety 
climate at a regional airline in the US. The specific questions associated with the 
current study were: 1) What are employee perceptions of the safety climate at 
the subject airline among and across the target studied groups: pilots, 
maintenance technicians, dispatchers, flight attendants, and the management of 
the subject airline?; 2) What are employee perceptions of the four SMS pillars at 
the subject airline, among and across the target study groups: pilots, 
maintenance technicians, dispatchers, flight attendants, and the management of 
the subject airline?; 3) What are employee perceptions of the safety culture at the 
subject airline among and across the target study groups: pilots, maintenance 
technicians, dispatchers, flight attendants, and the management of the subject 
airline?; 4) Are demographic elements such as age, gender, and length of 
employment, significant variables of perception of safety climate and/or safety 
culture at the subject airline? 
 The safety climate was analyzed by capturing the subject airline’s 
employee perception of safety through an on-line survey. The current study used 







interviews, surveys, and focus group activity. Data were processed and analyzed 
according to guidelines stipulated by the researcher. This chapter presents the 
results of the study. Qualitative results are presented as common themes 
identified from captured data. 
4.1 Analysis of Interviews  
4.1.1 Demographics Data 
This study conducted nine semi-structured interviews. Five participants were 
front-line employees. Four were managers. Three of the nine participants were 
from the safety department and three were from the group flight attendants. The 
categories pilots and maintenance technicians had one participant each. The 
remaining participant was from the flight reliability department. Table 6 displays 
the breakdown of participants' demographics. Participants’ period of employment 
with the subject airline ranged between one and 13 years, with an average of 
nine years.  
 
Table 6 A Summary of Interviewees’ Demographics 
 
Safety 3 Managers 4











4.1.2 Interview data analysis 
This study employed the thematic analysis approach to analyze transcribed 
interviews. According to Hennink (2014), thematic analysis is one of the most 
common data analysis methods in transcribed data. Thematic analysis allows a 
researcher to immerse into data by first breaking data into finer segments. This 
process allows for deeper understanding of the relationships raised by 
participants from participants’ own perspective. Interview data were transcribed 
verbatim as desired by the thematic analysis method, to allow researcher to 
effectively use quotations that capture participants’ emotions (Hennink, 2014). 
The data were coded and then grouped into common themes and sub-themes. 
Themes that strongly mirrored the five elements of safety culture were identified 
as such.   
4.2 Analysis from Open-ended Segment of Survey 
This section pertains to responses from an open-ended question on the 
survey that prompted participants to make additional comments regarding safety 
at the subject airline. The survey qualitative data were generated by 27 
participants who contributed in the additional comment section of the survey, as 
illustrated in table 7. Of the 27 participants, 11 were pilots, nine were 
maintenance technicians, and three were flight attendants. Two participants from 
the group other contributed to the qualitative survey segment as well as one each 
from the dispatchers and supervisory-level managers. There was no 







survey segment. The responses were transcribed, processed, coded, analyzed, 
and presented using procedures similar to those employed to analyze the 
interview segment of this study.     
Table 7 Summary of Demographics of Open-ended Survey Segment  
Category n 
Pilot 11 
Flight attendant 3 
Dispatch  1 
Manager - supervisor 1 
Manager - middle 0 
Manager - senior 0 
Maintenance  9 
Other 2 
Total 27 
4.3 Analysis from the Quantitative Segment of the Survey 
This study performed internal reliability testing for scale items under all seven 
variables in this study. The variables were three of the most common perceptions 
related to safety culture (perceived Managements’ commitment to safety, 
perceived Employee involvement is safety, and perceived Managements’ actions 
regarding safety (Dedobbeleer & Béland, 1991; Flint et al., 2000; Patankar et al., 
2012; Seo et al., 2004; Zohar, 2000)) and the four pillars of SMS (Safety policy, 
Safety Assurance, Safety risk management, and Safety promotion (FAA, 2015)). 
The last variable, Perception of management, concerned respondents’ view of 
management’s efforts towards improving safety at the subject airline. As 
suggested by Stevens (2002) the researcher performed a Cronbach’s Alpha test 
to ascertain the internal reliability of scale items within all the variables. Stevens 








indicator of a high internal consistency. Scale items within each variable ranged 
between three and seven as illustrated in Table 8.   





Safety climate perception 
elements 
Mgmt.'s commitment to safety  4 
Mgmt.'s actions  4 
Employee involvement in Safety  3 
      
SMS pillars  
Safety policy 5 
Safety assurance 5 
Safety risk management 4 
Safety promotion 6 
 
The scale items within all the variables registered Cronbach’s Alpha scores 
above .70, indicating internal consistency.    
 
4.3.1 Demographic Information  
Table 9 displays a summary of the characteristics of the sample used for 
this study. Eighty-nine participants attempted the online survey. Of these, 71 
completed the attempted surveys. The researcher excluded incomplete surveys 
from analysis of the present study. Forty-six percent (n = 33) of the completed 
surveys were from pilots, 23.9 % (n = 17) from maintenance technicians, and 
12.7% (n = 9) from the group Others. There were no responses recorded under 
the group Management-senior, while the groups Dispatch and Manager-
supervisor had one response (1.4%), each. Flight attendants and middle 








 Due to under-representation of participants in the Manager – supervisor 
category, the researcher consolidated this category with the Manager – middle 
level category in the analysis and discussion sessions. Additionally, the 
researcher excluded the group Dispatch from the quantitative segments of the 
current study due to underrepresentation of the group.   
 Participants were predominantly male (83%, n = 59). The largest age group 
range was that of 31 to 40 years (n = 25), followed closely by those in age group 
41 to 50 (n = 18). Two respondents recorded their age as over 60 years, while 














Variable Categories n % Cumulative %
< 1 16 22.5 22.5
1 - 5 24 33.8 56.3
6 - 10 19 26.8 83.1
> 10 12 16.9 100.0
Total 71 100.0
< 1 9 12.7 12.7
1 - 5 17 23.9 36.6
6 - 10 31 43.7 80.3
> 10 14 19.7 100.0
Total 71 100.0
21 - 30 12 16.9 16.9
31 - 40 25 35.2 52.1
41 - 50 18 25.4 77.5
51 - 60 11 15.5 93.0
> 60 2 2.8 95.8
Undisclosed 3 4.2 100.0
Total 71 100.0
Male 59 83.1 83.1
Female 10 14.1 97.2
Undisclosed 2 2.8 100
Total 71 100.0
Pilot 33 46.5 46.5
Flight Attendant 5 7.0 53.5
Dispatch 1 1.4 54.9
Manager-supervisor 1 1.4 56.3
Manager-middle 5 7.0 63.4
Manager-senior 0 0.0 63.4
Other 9 12.7 76.1
















The largest number of participants (43.7%, n = 31) had worked with the subject 
airline for between, and including, six and 10 years. Twelve percent (n = 16) of 
participants reported to have worked at the subject airline for less than a year, 
the lowest frequency captured by the data.  
Regarding years in current position, 33.8% (n = 24) of respondents had 
worked between one and five years; while 26.8% (n = 19) had worked between 
six to 10 years. Twenty-five percent (n = 16) and 16.9% (n = 12) of respondents 
had worked in their current positions for less than a year and for more than 10 
years, respectively.  
With job-groups as factors, flight attendants recorded to have the largest 
number of people who had worked with the subject airlines for the shortest time, 
of less than a year (Table 10). This value, for other groups, was between one 
and five years. These figures remained similar in regard to time range, under job 
category, that employee had worked at employee’s current job. The management 
group recorded the highest age category of most participants, considering job 
category, of 41 to 50 years. The rest of the groups recorded most participants to 
be in age group 31 to 40.  
 







n 33 5 6 17 9
Age range 31 - 40 31 - 40 41 - 50 31 - 40 31 - 40
Years worked at company 1 - 5 Less than 1 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5








4.4 Analysis of the Focus Group activity 
The researcher conducted one focus group activity, representing the 
middle-level management. There were eight participants in the focus group 
session. Table 11 shows the breakdown of participants. The length of the 
discussion session was one hour.  
Table 11 Summary of Representation of Focus Group Participants  
Category n 
Safety 3 
Flight attendant / Customer service 1 
Flight Operations  1 
Dispatch  1 
Maintenance  2 
Total 8 
 
4.5 Research Question One 
What are perceptions of the safety climate at the subject airline among and 
across the study groups: pilots, maintenance technicians, dispatchers, 
flight attendants, and the management of the subject airline? 
The null hypothesis for this question was that there were no significant 
differences between the studied groups regarding perception of safety climate at 
the subject airline. For this question, the studied groups were the response 
variables and participants’ scores, the independent variables. To determine the 
appropriate analytical approach relative to applicable assumptions, the 
researcher assessed the distribution of data as it pertains to normality, and then 








The Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used where data indicated 
symmetry/normal distribution and constant variance, according to Fleiss, Levin, 
and Paik (2013). Alternatively, as suggested by Fleiss et al. (2013), the 
researcher employed the Welch analysis for data that appeared to be distributed 
normally, but without constant variance. The researcher performed a Kruskal-
Wallis H test for data that appeared to be asymmetrical but with similar 
distribution and constant variance, to determine whether there were any 
statistically-significant differences between the studied groups. Noether (2012) 
recommends the Kruskal-Wallis for both continuous and ordinal dependent 
variables. Advantages the Kruskal-Wallis test has over other statistical analysis 
options such as one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) include the disregard for 
normality assumption and lowered sensitivity to outliers, as well as its ability to 
accommodate ordinal data (Noether, 2012). The researcher used an alpha value 
of 0.05, for all calculations, standard in social sciences (Newey & McFadden, 
1994), to limit the probability of committing type I error to 5%.  
4.5.1 Between-groups safety climate comparison 
Test of assumptions for this question indicated skewed distributing among 
the groups Maintenance and Other regarding perceived Management’s 
commitment to safety. All five elements of safety climate reported p values 
above .05, relating to the assessment of homogeneity, indicating constant 
variance across the all job categories. The Kruskal-Wallis test investigated 
whether any of the studied groups were statistically different in their perceptions 








difference among employees with regard to the variable, Management’s 
commitment to safety, in the Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric testing. 
 
Figure 7. Between-groups nonparametric safety culture testing 
Figure 8 provides evidence that the statistical significant difference observed in 
the perception Management’s commitment to safety, is due to significant 
difference between maintenance technicians and flight attendants, with a p 
value of 0.008, in the pair-wise comparison.  
 









To assess whether there were variations among all employees pertaining 
to the three perceptions of safety climate considered in the current study, the 
researcher first transformed data wide-to-long through the SPSS statistical 
software program. The researcher performed a Mixed-model linear assessment. 
Table 12 indicates no statistically-significant difference in employee perception, 
as a whole, of the three elements of safety climate at the subject airline (ρ = .074) 
Table 12 Among Group Safety Climate Test 
 
4.6 Research Question Two 
What are employee perceptions of the four SMS pillars at the subject airline, 
among and across the target study groups: pilots, maintenance 
technicians, dispatchers, flight attendants, and the management of the 
subject airline? 
Statistical procedures for this question were similar to that of question one. 
Between-employee perception of the four pillars of SMS. Figure 9 shows results 
for cross-group comparison among the studied groups, regarding the four pillars 












Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
1 
The distribution of Safety Policy is the 




Reject the null 
hypothesis. 
2 
The distribution of Safety Assurance is 





Reject the null 
hypothesis. 
3 
The distribution of Safety Risk 
Management is the same across 




Reject the null 
hypothesis. 
4 
The distribution of Safety Promotion is the 




Reject the null 
hypothesis. 
Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05. 
Figure 9. Cross-groups SMS pillars comparison 
Figure 10 indicates statistical significance across all four pillars of safety culture, 
with ρ values ranging from .009 to .028. For pairwise comparison, figure 13 
indicates that the significant relationships across the four pillars are due to 
differences in perception across all the four pillars between maintenance 
technicians and flight attendants (ρ = .019).    
 
 
Figure 10. Pairwise comparison for the four SMS pillars  
 
 








 Table 14 indicates statistical difference among employees perception of the 
four pillars of SMS.   
Table 13 Among Group Test 
 
4.7 Research Question Three 
What are perceptions of the safety culture at the subject airline among and 
across the studied groups: pilots, maintenance technicians, dispatchers, 
flight attendants, and the management of the subject airline? 
4.7.1 Results of Responses from Interview Sessions 
4.7.1.1 Safety Resources 
Regarding the general knowledge of safety programs at the subject airline, 
of the 11 safety programs identified by participants, seven of the nine participants 
indicated they regarded the ASAP program highly, followed by FOQA and the 
Fatigue Risk Management Program (FRMP). Two participants indicated a of lack 
of clarity regarding the choice of which safety reporting system to use in the 
event of a safety incident. “[Referring to IRS and ASAP safety programs] …to be 
honest I kinda get the two mixed up sometimes…” one of the two participants 
illustrated. All non-safety personnel (six) acknowledged some level of interaction 
with safety personnel. The most common interactions with safety personnel 








hire training and annual re-training, as well as through safety-related publications. 
All participants were familiar with safety-related publications, notably, the monthly 
safety newsletters and safety memos. All participants also indicated they 
received safety education and information through safety training, monthly safety 
newsletters, or safety memos.  
All flight attendants emphasized the significance that the new-hire training 
and the annual re-training contributed to their knowledge of safety, as well as the 
positive impact on flight operational safety. In stressing the value of training, a 
participant stated“…safety starts literally from initial training… safety is the 
primary focus of our training”. Another flight attendant felt that flight attendants 
were “trained at the same level of safety as pilots. So, there’s really never a time 
when we are not equipped to handle a specific event or emergency”.     
4.7.1.2 Perceptions of safety across groups in the subject airline. 
Two questions were used to assess participants’ perceptions of the job 
categories or departments in the subject airline they regarded as most safe, as 
well as job categories or departments they felt were least safe. On the question 
concerning the safest departments in the subject organization, three participants 
named the pilot group as the safest, while two participants identified the flight 
attendant group as the safest. One participant each selected the safety 
department and the maintenance group as safest. Regarding the rating of unsafe 
groups in the subject airline, four participants proposed the maintenance group 








another participant suggested that all individuals in the organization share equal 
responsibility for safety standing.   
Some of the reasons provided by participants for selecting the pilot group 
as the safest group include the pilots groups good “reporting culture”, length of 
time the group has been reporting, greater engagement in safety programs, and 
the group’s nature of being the “most cautious”. In addition, two participants 
credited their choice of pilots and flight attendants as safety groups to what they 
described as the integration of safety-risk management protocols in to the two 
groups’ tasks such as by pilots’ use of checklists and standard operating 
procedures. Of pilots, a participant explained, “[safety] …it’s just integrated into 
everything we do”. The participant added, “The manual if you comply with SOPs 
and stuff you’re complying with safety in-built into the manual. Just make sure 
that you stay within the safety footprint”.  
 One participant noted that the difference in the perceived high active-risk 
associated with pilots’ and flight attendants’ role compared to perceived lower-
risk with the maintenance group as reason for the participant’s highest and 
lowest ratings for the two groups respectively. The participant explained “I think 
they [pilots] tend to be more cautious than anybody because they’re flying the 
airplane, and they are the one putting passengers and other people directly at 
risk. [Of maintenance technicians having a different view] its looks fixed in my 
opinion sitting on the ground, [while it would be] a little too much for comfort for 
me [crew] because I would be flying a couple of hundred passengers. I think 








“historically” relatively better reporting and just cultures environment pilots 
operate within, compared to other groups in the organization, was also 
mentioned by a participant as an additional reason for cross-groups differences 
as it regards to view of safety standing among groups.  
4.7.1.3 Perceptions towards Management  
While all interview participants portrayed senior management as largely 
disengaged from front-line employees, this view contrasted across the various 
groups and scenarios. For instance, vice president of safety at the subject airline 
was credited by a participant for improving safety at the subject airlines in recent 
times “since our VP is here now… …the level of safety is higher than it was”. 
Four of the participants attributed the positive feedback regarding progress of 
safety at the department, to the supervisory and middle management levels of 
leadership. One participant indicated a relatively closer relationship between 
middle management and flight crew as one of the reasons the participant viewed 
the flight operations department as safest.  
 Over half of participants cited detachment by senior managers across the 
entire organization in the increasing order: the pilot, flight attendant, safety 
department, and maintenance technician, respectively. These participants also 
indicated the disengagement by the management as one of the major challenges 
in the effective promotion of positive safety culture within the organization. 
Identified forms of detachment included insufficient physical presence, ineffective 








management regarding analysis of safety data. Regarding the need for more 
senior management involvement, one participant stated, “getting a sound 
audience with executive management… to listen to our concerns because we 
see the data like no one else”. Another noted, “Oversight from the maintenance 
to management, I don’t think it’s really there, they [senior managers] don’t seem 
to be committed to being out on the line, out in the hangar lots of the times”. 
Another contribution concludes, “I think for my recommendations would be for 
upper management to be open to suggestions”     
4.7.1.4 Areas of notable progress 
All interview respondents indicated that safety had improved in the recent 
past and expressed high hopes of progress regarding safety. This study did not 
establish the specific timeline suggested by participants. One participant 
expressed his optimism, “I think people want to embrace safety...”  “[the] 
company came a long way in addressing safety issues” another participant 
weighed in. One urged the subject airline not to “stop this train of improvement”, 
while another concluded “I think generally as a company we are headed in the 
right direction”. One participant however highlighted the challenge that lies ahead 
concerning improving safety, “I think we still have a long way to go, but I think it 
will take a long time. I think we have a long way to go because we have to let the 
old go, the punitive” 
Flight attendants indicated that flight attendants at the subject airline were 








ASAP program. They proposed that increased realized value of the ASAP 
program and the increased knowledge about the ASAP program, specifically, its 
non-punitive nature, as two main reasons for the more positive acceptance of the 
ASAP program among flight attendants. Flight attendants cited two benefits as 
most important to have been realized by the ASAP program; increased 
knowledge about turbulence-related safety issues and increased understanding 
of pilot-flight attendant interaction, as it regards to safety. A flight attendant 
identified some of the benefits of the improved pilot-flight attendant CRM to 
include a more streamlined common safety-related phraseologies, which the 
participant alluded to, as having promoted clearer communication between the 
two groups. This, the participants alleged, had been critical to improving safety, 
particularly related to turbulence “[of improved streamlined phraseology]…and 
the injuries a year later show that obviously it worked”, the participant concluded.  
Overall, all participants expressed a generally optimistic outlook on safety in 
the organization.  
4.7.1.5 Areas of potential progress 
Safety Reporting 
The pilots group was identified by four participants as having the best 
reporting and safety cultures. On the other hand, some participants also 
expressed the need to improve the two cultures across the entire subject airline. 
Data suggested the ASAP program remained largely unpopular among 








attendants. Unjust culture, poor reporting culture, and demanding working 
conditions such as time pressure, were cited by some participants as among the 
main reasons they thought the maintenance technician group was the least safe. 
Three participants indicated the Incident Reporting System, a predecessor 
to the ASAP program, as the least well-regarded safety reporting program. 
Participants pointed out the punitive nature of the Incident Reporting System 
program as the main reason for its unpopularity. While all interview participants 
demonstrated knowledge of multiple safety reporting programs, two participants 
indicated lack of confidence as to which program to use to report an incident, 
especially among the non-pilot group.  
Fatigue Risk Management Program (FRMP) 
There was mixed feedback regarding the FRMP from two participants. One 
suggested “Pilot trust in fatigue management program which is getting better…” 
However, another participant took a more reserved view “some people complain 
about it with our fatigue program… …because if it is a self-induced fatigue and I 
think that creates an environment where some people will not call in fatigue 
because of fear they may get some sort of discipline action”. The participant 
concluded “I think an area of improvement would be on the fatigue part is not 
issuing an occurrence to someone if they feel they should not, or are too tired to 
fly”. The ‘penalty’, explained the participant, was in the form of an ‘occurrence’.   
 Another area of improvement as identified by two participants was dealing 
with sense of “invincibility” and “complacency” among some flight attendants 








turbulence. “I know what the pilot said, I know there’s going to be turbulence,… 
…I have been doing this for a long time, I know what I am doing”, one participant 
explained as an illustration of ‘invincibility’ attitude allegedly common among 
some flight attendants, following a warning from the cockpit crew pertaining to an 
imminent turbulence event. “…that’s the issue we’re battling”, the participant 
concludes.  
Pressure to complete work in time was highlighted by three participants as 
common among maintenance technicians. One participant indicated that 
pressure from management is common. Another participant alluded that, 
pressure out of the need to keep aircraft flying was just the nature of the job. 
Time was limited, the participant explained, due to the limited time an aircraft is 
available for maintenance service, number of aircraft that need to be worked on, 
and the number of items that each aircraft need to be worked on. One participant 
suggested a psychological reason, that in addition, they simply work had 
because they “don’t want to put pressure on our passengers, where passengers 
are waiting out on the tarmac”.  
4.7.2 Results of Responses from the Open-ended Survey Question 
4.7.2.1 Results Pertaining to Pilots 
Reporting, Informed, and Informed cultures  
 Eight of the nine participants indicated they viewed the pilot group as very 
safety conscious, including healthy reporting and informed cultures. Among the 








prevalence of reporting systems such as FOQA, “LOSA”, and ASAP. However, 
six pilot participants inferred hesitation among pilots as it pertained to making 
fatigue and sick-day calls to what participants cited as “punitive”.  
 
Pilots’ fatigue management program 
Comments regarding the subject company’s fatigue management program 
included “Fatigue is STILL a big deal”, “I don't feel our fatigue or sick call policies 
are in the best interest of safety”, and “Fatigue policy can be punitive and crews 
are always expected to extend part 117 duty times…” One participant indicated 
that fatigue calls are generally not well received by the management and/or the 
scheduling department. The participant expressed “Call in fatigued, and you will 
most certainly get some attitude from the company at some level.  When was the 
last time that the company pulled crewmembers pre-emptively for likely being 
fatigued?” One participant suggests that fatigue is “not taken seriously” because 
it is “less easily quantifiable safety issues” and its effects “hard to measure”.   
Cost and productivity versus safety  
Data suggested a consensus that productivity and cost effectiveness were 
more important than safety. One participant argues that aircraft and passenger 
safety are usually a priority but adds, “However there are times where a pilot on 
the verge of a fatigue call, or telling or asking crew scheduling about his/her duty 
limitations are, where safety is dropped for completing the flight”. Another 
participant warned, “Do not allow money to be the deciding factor when it relates 








adds “The idea that it is normal, or acceptable to deviate from the FOM/GOM, 
SOP, or FAM as a matter of routine should be seen as a major failure of the 
safety culture at “deleted”[subject airline], but it is accepted by management 
because it doesn't hurt their bottom line”. Sentiments towards this position were 
also more pronounced among responses from maintenance technicians. These 
sentiments included “accomplishment is still the priority, not safety” and “I have 
witnessed mechanics, supervisors, inspectors, managers, and directors all ignore 
safety in lieu of production goals”. The researcher was unable to substantiate 
these claims.   
Routine safety violations  
 While there was a strong consensus that there was habitual disregard for 
safety across the subject organization, data also indicated specific routine safety 
violations. One of the stronger comments was that subject airline had “fostered” a 
“the culture of noncompliance” and “encouraged” “deviations. For instance, a 
participant claimed, “99% of flights depart with the same violation of SOP 
‘dropping the brake’". Another mentioned the health and safety concerns posed 
by excessive dust from sanding and grinding works. According to the participant, 
as the sanding and grinding machines have safety guards and dust covers 
removed, employees were exposed to excessive dust, which makes it difficult for 
the sanders to have a clear view of the tools, hence heightening hazards. One 
participant alludes to policies and manual that “cannot be reasonably complied 
with” as reason for noncompliance. The participant explains “The idea that it is 








of routine should be seen as a major failure of the safety culture at [subject 
airline]”. The researcher was unable to verify the stated claims.  
Other safety concerns mentioned by participants included alleged 
incidences of “very” inexperienced pilots flying the “left seat” so they could attain 
100 hours, usually at the expense of more experienced captain, and well as 
overreliance on two captains crews when a first officer in not available, a moved 
indicated by the participant as prohibited by other airlines.   
4.7.2.2 Maintenance Technicians  
Productivity versus safety 
Similar to pilots’ expression, many maintenance technicians felt the subject 
airline prioritized productivity more than safety. Data portrayed unlearning and 
inflexible cultures as dominant within the maintenance community. The 
systematic ignorance of safety concerns was described as prevailing among all 
levels of employees including maintenance technicians, supervisors, inspectors, 
managers, and directors. Data also suggested that safety policies only for “show” 
and not “enforced”. One participant described managers as “bully” towards 
frontline employee when safety “issues are brought up”. 
Other notable concerns 
A participant indicated safety concerns regarding employees who were 
physically handicapped, in the event of an emergency. The participant did not 
identify the specific safety hazards but suggested relocating employees in 








Another safety concern pertained to maintenance technicians, and 
addressed the manner in which aircraft were habitually staged while undergoing 
maintenance procedures. Often, technicians worked under and around an aircraft 
that is supported on a single bottle jack with both bottle wheels; this, despite the 
lack of a safety stand, which should be in place in case the jack should fail, 
topple, or punch through the floor, as has supposedly happened, multiple times.   
4.7.2.3 Flight Attendants  
A flight attendant felt pilots were “very” safety minded and that “most” flight 
attendants did not “comprehend the hidden safety issues impacting, or affected 
by… [their]… job and/or actions”. “The general lack of job happiness is 
ubiquitous with both the flight deck crew and cabin crew” added another, and as 
such, the participant “hardly” sees “anyone going the extra mile to do their jobs 
above and beyond just the bare minimum to not get fired”. A third respondent 
identified the galley cart as the main hazard among flight attendants’ job during 
flights. The flight attendant linked the hazard to the carts’ movement, weight, and 
size, recommending research into the use of ‘half carts’.  
4.7.2.4 Other 
A participant from the group Other suggested that safety is promoted less 
by the subject airline to employees who do not work directly on aircraft. “The 
company only hears what it wants to hear”, wrote another participant. The 
participant added that employee safety reporting was low because of a punitive 








4.7.3 Results of Responses from Focus Group Activity  
The purpose of the focus group activity was to gain deeper understanding 
of common themes identified from the survey and interview segments of this 
study. From the thematic analysis of the transcribed data, the researcher 
identified eight common themes. The themes included safety-operations balance, 
communication, the ASAP program, and discrepancies in reporting across 
groups. Other themes developed from the data were feedback, fatigue 
management program, crew resource management, and possible areas of safety 
concerns.  
4.7.3.1 Safety versus operation/business balance 
Four participants identified that decisions regarding the balance between 
safety and business interests were the most significant and frequent challenge 
they faced. “It’s always challenging to balance safety versus operations” noted 
one participant, as another confirmed, “I would second what the commenter has 
just said, that, it is always a balance between safety and operations”. Among 
reasons proposed by some of the participants as contributing to the challenge in 
maintaining the balance, include the faster pace of expansion of the subject 
airline, concerning employee size, size of operations, and greater geographical 
reach.  
4.7.3.2 Communication  
Data suggested an overall poor communication throughout across all 








communication efficiency has not kept up with the rate of expansion of the airline. 
Another participant suggested that the expansion of the airlines had increased 
vertical separation between employee hierarchies and had also affected 
communication between the hierarchies negatively. The geographical expansion 
of the subject airline was also cited as a factor of poor communication by a 
participant. Yet another participant suggested the fast pace of growth, rather than 
the growth itself was a negative variable to effective communication. Elements 
cited by some participants as most susceptible to poor communication included 
safety-specific information, time sensitive information, and bottom-up 
communication.  
4.7.3.3 ASAP program 
 Responses to the ASAP program was overwhelmingly positive and 
optimistic among all participants. The program was cited by all participants as 
vital to identifying safety issues and prompting relevant solutions for the identified 
safety issues. In addition to safety related data, a participant reasoned that other 
benefits included information useful for personnel management, regulations, and 
financial decisions. Two participants agreed that the ASAP program working in 
tandem with the FOQA program provides a basis for a robust safety 
management system. However, one comment suggested the program was 
relatively new among maintenance technicians and another suggested it was 








4.7.3.4 Discrepancies in incident reporting across studied groups  
Various reasons were given by participants for the differences in reporting 
culture across groups in subject airline, as suggested by results from interviews 
and survey. Three participants argued that safety issues related to flight 
attendant and pilots tended to be more definitive, compared to those experienced 
by maintenance technicians, hence were likely to be reported by the former 
groups. Two participants cited that often, mistakes or errors made by flight 
attendants and/or pilots were likely to be noted and/or reported by external 
groups such as air traffic controllers or data programs such as FOQA. This factor, 
the participant argued, compels pilots and flight attendants to report safety 
incidents, compared to the maintenance personnel who, according to the 
participant’s view exercised a more flexible discretion. Pilots in particular, a 
respondent added, were motivated to report incidents by the ASAP’s program 
element that protected their licenses when they reported correctly and qualified 
for the inferred protection. Another comment suggested that quicker feedback 
encouraged reporting from pilots. Yet, another proposed that pilots, by nature, 
felt personal obligation to report incidents that they thought would be helpful to 
other pilots and the company.  
Numerous reasons were proposed by several participants for the weak 
reporting culture. One suggested that maintenance technicians “just aren’t as 
comfortable” reporting. Two participants contend that, by nature, humans are 
slow to change, and given the ASAP program was relatively new among 








improve with time. As an example, the participants drew comparison to the fact 
that trust was now fully developed among pilots as it regards to the ASAP 
program, partly due to the length of time the ASAP program had been in place 
among pilots. The two participants also related the still growing trust among pilots 
concerning the FOQA and fatigue management programs, as well as among 
flight attendants, in regard to the ASAP program. Additionally, lack of quick 
feedback, three participants proposed, may have created a sense that incident 
reporting was not valuable, hence unnecessary, to employees exhibit low 
incident reporting.   
4.7.3.5 Fatigue management program 
“The fatigue program is really tough… I think a lot people were probably 
flying fatigued”, noted a participant, but added that the program had undergone 
some changes since the researcher of the current study had completed the 
interview and survey segments of the current study. A contentious element, 
continued the participant, had been regular accrual of “occurrences” to pilots’ 
records following some fatigue-calls, which, according to the participant, pilots 
largely viewed as punitive. Two participants discussed and disagreed about 
whether “occurrences’ on one’s record constituted something negative or 
otherwise. A major change that had been done to the fatigue management 
program, explained another participant, was the removal of ‘occurrences’ from all 
fatigue-calls, and that, as a result, fatigue-calls had increased. The second 








program. However, the participant continued, improved education about the 
program had resulted in the program being abused less. The first contributor to 
this theme warned that lack of same level of privacy and anonymity expectations 
associated with other safety programs such as ASAP remained a challenge to 
overcome regarding the fatigue management program. Nevertheless, the 
participant suggested that more changes to improve the program should be 
expected.      
4.7.3.6 Crew resource management (CRM)  
Participants identified several employee relationships across the groups 
that affected their performance as well as safety considerations. These 
relationships included the executive versus middle management versus front-line 
employee; pilot versus flight attendant; pilot and flight attendant versus senior 
management; and pilot vs dispatch.   
One participant proposed that whereas there were CRM issues between 
pilots and flight attendants, often, the two groups are agreeable to some of the 
issue, but the groups would often be pitted against the management, in respect 
to the specific issues they would have agreed on. “[Regarding differing 
management’s views]…the management think it’s a whole different situation, 
they have a different perspective”, a participant elaborated. A case in point, the 
participant added, was lack of guidance from the management concerning 
differing emergency guidelines between the two groups. Regarding pilots and 








communication that may lead to misunderstanding and mistrust between the two 
groups. For example, a new fuel procedure that is communicated to one group 
and not the other, may cause confusion to the uninformed group, stated the 
participant. Poor communication, believed four participants, was the main reason 
of sometimes-poor relationship between the airline’s hierarchies levels, often 
leaving middle managers feeling “stuck” in the middle.   
4.7.3.7 Suggested possible areas of improvement  
While poor communication was cited by majority (five) of participants as a 
chronic issue company-wide, one participant expressed liking improvements 
related to communication. Another participant cited pro-activeness in risk 
assessment before implementing new policies and procedures as positive 
elements, while another participant acknowledged the important role played by 
the union as pertains to improving safety.  
Some elements were identified by a few participants as priority-areas, as it 
relates to safety culture. A participant was concerned with the low rates of 
incident reporting among maintenance technicians. The participant suggested 
increased feedback to maintenance technicians would help to improve reporting 
and expressed optimism that reporting culture would improve as employees 
become more familiar with and gain comfort with the ASAP program. Another 
participant hoped management would engage more to improve CRM between 
pilots and flight attendants, and between pilot-flight attendant unison and senior 








infoshare seminar earlier in the year, had yet to be addressed. Also, concerning 
flight attendants, a participant reiterated that although benefits of the ASAP 
program had been apparent, an additional major challenge they are still to 
overcome is the tendency of some flight attendants to keep working, serving 
customers during events of turbulence because “they think they’re going to get in 
trouble” despite of assurances from the management.  
Two participants suggested that more work be done in the area of 
automation. Concerns related to automation included improper use, over-reliance, 
and loss of proficiency in hand-flying of aircraft. A concern related to the dispatch 
group was low experience due to high employee turnover rates.   
4.8 Research Question Four 
Are demographic elements such as age, gender, and length of employment, 
significant variables of perception of safety climate at the subject airline?  
Statistical procedures for this question were similar to that of questions 
one and two. To answer question four, the researcher used Kruskal-Wallis H 
nonparametric tests to determine whether the dependent variables under 
investigation were statistically different. The researcher used an alpha value 
of .05 to limit type I error to 5%. A Bonferroni adjustment was used where 
necessary to adjust the ρ value for more accurate results.    
4.8.1 Results of age-group as a variable of safety climate 
Results for testing age groups as independent variables of safety climate 








commitment to safety and perceived Employee involvement in safety (figure 11). 
Figure 12 shows the results of pairwise comparison among the age groups. For 
pair-wise comparison, age group was not a statistically significant factor in of 
Management’s commitment to safety.   
 




Figure 12. Age-group pairwise comparison – perceived employee 










4.8.2 Results of the assessment of the number of years of employment with 
company as a variable of safety climate 
Number of years individuals had worked at a company appeared to 
influence participants’ perception of Management’s commitment to safety and 
Management’s actions (figures 13, 14, and 15).  
 




Figure 14. Management Action: Pair-wise comparison of categories of the number of 









Figure 15. Management’s commitment to safety: Pair-wise comparison of categories of 
the number of years exmployees had worked with company.  
 
4.8.3 Results of the number of years employee had worked at current job as a 
variable of safety climate 
As shown in figure 16, there were no statistically-significant scores in the 
Kruskal-Wallis Test - all pair-wise comparisons, to suggest age category, in years, 
that survey participants had worked at their current jobs, was a variable in 










Figure 16. Number of years woked at current job 
 
4.8.4 Results of gender as a variable of safety climate 
Testing for gender as a significant variable of Safety culture rejected the null 
hypothesis, indicating gender was as a statistically-significant factor of 
Management’s commitment to safety at ρ = .025 (figure 17), with females having 
a higher perception compared to male (figure 18).   
 










Figure 18. Age pairwise comparison 
 
4.8.5 Results of perception towards management 
 As shown by figure 19, data did not indicate statistical significance across the 
groups on the groups’ view of management’s commitment towards enhancing 
safety at the subject airline.   
 
Figure 19. Perception of management’s commitment to safety 
 
4.8.6 Results of groups’ average safety score  
The survey asked participants to provide a score, of between 1 and 10, 10 
being the highest, of their rating of safety culture at the subject airline. The mean 
score among all participants was 6.5. Tests indicated data met assumptions for 
 
Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
 
The distribution of Perception 
towards Management is the same 




Retain the null 
hypothesis. 








homogeneity (F = .52, ρ = .71), but not normality. With a ρ value of .323 (figure 
20), the Kruskal-Wallis result indicates there was no significant difference 
between employee groups regarding perception of the average safety score at 
the subject airline.  
 
Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
1 
The distribution of Average 
safety score is the same 






Retain the null 
hypothesis. 
Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05. 
Figure 20. Job category as variable for safety score  
4.8.7 Results of employee perception of management’s commitment to safety  
Regarding responses on employee view of management’s commitment to 
safety at the subject airline, data (figure 21) indicates there was job category was 
not a significant factor of employee perception of management’s commitment to 
safety at the subject airline.  
 
 
Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
1 
The distribution of employee 
perception of Mgmt. is the 






Retain the null 
hypothesis. 
Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05. 
Figure 21. Employee perception of management’s commitment to safety 
4.9 Summary of Findings 
The purpose of the current study was to assess employee perception of the 
safety culture, safety climate, and four pillars of SMS at a regional airline. Front 








dispatchers, and managers participated in this study. The specific objectives of 
the current study were to answer the following research questions:  
1. What are employee perceptions of the safety climate at the subject airline 
among and across the target study groups: pilots, maintenance 
technicians, dispatchers, flight attendants, and the management of the 
subject airline? 
2. What are employee perceptions of the four SMS pillars at the subject 
airline, among and across the target study groups: pilots, maintenance 
technicians, dispatchers, flight attendants, and the management of the 
subject airline?  
3. What are employee perceptions of the safety culture at the subject airline 
among and across the target study groups: pilots, maintenance 
technicians, dispatchers, flight attendants, and the management of the 
subject airline? 
4. Are demographic elements such as age, gender, and length of 
employment, significant variables of perception of safety climate and/or 
safety culture at the subject airline?  
The current study used a mixed method and cross-sessional design to 
investigate the research questions. The researcher collected data through 
interview, focus group, and online survey. The focus group session intended to 
gain further understanding of responses from the online survey and the interview 
segments of the current. Results indicate flight attendants perceived Just and 








data suggests flight attendants had a higher perception of all the pillars of SMS 
than maintenance technicians did. Result of the current study failed to dispute 
the null hypothesis that there was no difference among all employees concerning 
their perception of the five elements of safety culture.  
Regarding safety culture, data indicates a significant prominence and value 
of the ASAP program. Employee responses suggest data reporting may be 
correlated to a number of variables such as perceived risk, ability for a third party 
to be knowledgeable about an incident in question, desire to protect oneself from 









CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Chapter four provided the analysis and results of the study. This chapter 
will provide a summary of the current study. It will discuss the results of the 
present study, suggest possible implications of current study, address the study’s 
limitations, and offer recommendations. This chapter will end with conclusions to 
the present study.   
5.1 Summary of Findings 
The purpose of the present study was to assess the safety culture and 
safety climate at a regional airline. The target population was pilots, maintenance 
technicians, flight attendants, dispatchers, and managers of the subject airline. 
The study also evaluated participants’ perception of the subject airline’s SMS. 
This chapter provides the results and analysis of the mixed method approach 
that utilized three data capturing techniques in the current study: interview, focus 
group activity, and online survey. The researcher applied appropriate data 
analysis techniques including thematic approach within inductive reasoning and 
inferential statistics to answer the research questions. 
The first research question investigated whether there were variations in 
employee perception of the safety climate among and between studied groups, 








segment of the online safety climate survey was used to investigate this question. 
Results suggest that flight attendants regarded Management’s commitment to 
safety higher than maintenance technicians did, at the subject airline. Data did 
not indicate a significant difference among all participants in this area.  
The second research question investigated whether there were variations 
in employee perception of the four pillars of SMS among and between studied 
groups at the subject airline. The researcher used participants’ responses from 
the quantitative segment of the online survey to investigate this question. Results 
indicate a significant difference among participants regarding the four pillars of 
SMS. Results also indicate flight attendants’ perception of all the four pillars of 
SMS was significantly positive compared to that of maintenance technicians.  
The third research question investigated whether there were variations in 
employee perception of the safety culture among and between studied groups, at 
the subject airline. The researcher used all three data capturing techniques: 
interview, open-ended segment of the online safety climate survey, and the focus 
group activity, to answer this research question. Data from the three sources 
indicated the ASAP program was largely successful or promising at the subject 
airline. In addition to observations such as relatively positive reporting and just 
cultures among pilots and flight attendants; other notable observation by the data 
include, the new-hire training and annual retraining activities were critical to 
safety training; and the monthly safety newsletter and memos were identified as 
the most accessible safety publications. Elements unfavorable to safety, as 








poor communication across the subject airline, a weak reporting culture among 
maintenance technicians, cases of some flight attendants not adhering to proper 
responses during turbulence events, and pilots’ reluctance to using the fatigue 
management program.   
The fourth research question investigated demographic variables as factors 
influencing perception of safety climate at the subject airline. The researcher of 
the current study used data from the online safety climate survey to investigate 
this question. Results indicated that the age, gender, and length of time an 
employee had worked with the subject airline were factors, which influenced the 
workers’ perception of safety climate. Data did not support the hypothesis that 
the number of years an employee had worked at their current job was a factor 
affecting perception of safety climate. Equally, data did not show that job-group 
was a significant factor in employee perception of management’s commitment to 
safety at the subject airline. Table 14 shows a summary of all study participants’ 
top five overall perceptions, negative as well as positive responses, regarding 
safety culture and safety climate at the subject airline according to the researcher.    
Table 14 Aggregated Participants’ Perceptions  
Positive perceptions Negative perceptions 
Safety progress & optimism  Management out of touch 
ASAP- most successful safety program  Poor communication feedback  
Pilot - safest group Maint. Tech - least safe group 
Safety training is effective Safety sacrificed for productivity  










SMS is a top-down comprehensive method of managing organizational 
safety (GAO, 2012; ICAO, 2009). The collection of the quantity and quality of 
data is increasingly becoming significant to safety (GAO, 2012), especially to 
efforts to shift the approach to safety towards a predictive approach, which is 
enshrined in SMS (FAA, 2015). The purpose of SMS is to reduce risks to 
acceptable levels (Ayres et al., 2009) and to attain a dynamic organizational 
safety culture that nurtures positive safety behavior such as safety reporting 
(Rose, 2006). FAA (2015) states that while the Safety risk Management and 
Safety assurance are the most important of the four SMS pillars, safety culture is 
a critical variable of success of any safety program. The proper understanding of 
safety culture by leaders in the aviation industry and by other aviation safety 
stakeholders has the potential to improve aviation operational safety (von 
Thaden, 2008). The current study assessed safety climate, culture, and 
employee perception of SMS at the subject airline, all vital elements of a robust 
operational safety.  
Several results in the current study mirror results observed from other 
scholarly works. The current study suggests that employee incident reporting is 
motivated by positive and negative stimuli. Positive stimuli identified by the study 
included pilots’ inherent pro-activeness to safety, a more active-hazard 
environment (as it regards to pilots and maintenance technicians, and just culture. 
Negative stimuli included the need to protect pilots’ license, ambiguity in what 








technicians), an inherent low desire to report, and an environment of unjust or 
blame culture (also as indicated by data to be the case among some 
maintenance technicians). The stated outcomes of the current study mirror 
observation some observations by other researchers in related studies (Adjekum 
et al., 2015; Cooper, 2001; Cox & Cox, 1991; FAA, 2014; GAIN Working Group, 
2004; and Hudson, 2001b.)  
The seemingly overwhelming success of the ASAP program, particularly 
among flight attendants, may help explain why flight attendants seemed to 
perceive safety climate, safety culture, and Management’s commitment to safety, 
more positively than maintenance technicians did. Researchers (Shappell & 
Wiegmann’s, 2000; Tsay et a, 2014) have addressed the importance of the role 
of senior managers plays in the success of safety programs, including 
formulations of effective safety policies and safety promotion strategies. It is 
possible that flight attendants felt that the managers played a significant roles in 
what flight attendants portrayed as success with the ASAP program, including its 
effective promotion as well as adhering to the significant non-punitive aspect of 
the program. The two “important” practical applications (pilot-flight attendant 
improved CRM and turbulence-related safety improvements) indicated by 
respondents as resulting from the ASAP program, may have also give an 
impression of management’s involvement in terms of feedback and other 
systematic support regarding flight attendants. This is in stark contrast to 
maintenance technicians, whom, as data indicates, the management was most 








However, as there were no significant differences among all responses as a 
group in regards to safety climate, and that some elements of safety culture such 
as senior management being “out-of-touch” with employees, may underline 
common or systematic latent organizations negative aspects of safety. The 
difference between flight attendants and maintenance technicians in reference to 
just culture, learning culture, the four pillars of SMS, and perception of the 
general safety culture. Four out of five flight attendants who responded to the 
safety climate survey were female. Across all the three segments of the present 
study, flight attendants responded overwhelmingly positively regarding the ASAP 
program, including valuable feedback, just culture, and practical changes as a 
result. This is in line with previous research that suggests factors such as 
effective feedback, communication, and just cultures positively affect safer 
practices (Liou et al., 2008; Reason, 1998). 
While participants suggested, regarding safety climate, that pilots were best 
at safety reporting, data suggests that flight attendants perception of safety 
culture was most contrasting with that of maintenance technicians, whose 
perception of the same was least positive. A possible explanation, as indicated 
by data from the current study, is that flight attendants’ positive responses could 
be influenced by the fairly new success the group had experienced with the 
ASAP safety program. In contrast, for example, the group pilot was perceived as 
safest and had had longer experiences with safety programs such as ASAP, 
except for the fatigue management program, but did not register statistically 








studied. Additionally, as indicated by data, flight attendants also scored well in 
safety culture, but were more likely to report incidents purely for safety promotion 
and safety risk management reasons. Pilots, on the other hand, may have more 
reasons to report incidents, such as protection of their licenses or the ability of 
another department, such as air traffic control, to report the same incident. It can 
however argued that, regardless of the reasons for reporting the incidents, 
increased reporting is better than no or under-reporting. An element of interest, 
and of possible research interest, could be the quality of reporting based of the 
reason for reporting. Stolzer (2011) lists possible limitations of human reporting 
systems as non-reporting and partial or false reporting and suggests automatic 
data transmission system as a possible remedy to these limitations.  
The study indicated no significant difference in perception of safety climate 
among job categories; perception of safety climate, given the number of years an 
employee had worked at employee’s current job; safety rating, given the job type; 
and perception of management’s commitment to safety, given the a job category. 
Possible reasons for these observations could be explained by a series of 
underlying similarities in qualitative responses among respondents, whether 
positive or negative. Positive underlying responses include a general perception 
that safety has improved much in ‘recent times’, a general positive outlook on 
safety at the subject airline, the role played by the safety team, and an 
overwhelming positive regard for the ASAP safety program. Negative similarities 
include the perception of the management as out of touch from front line 








hierarchies; unjust culture; and perception of management’s prioritization of 
productivity over safety.  
Participants who had worked at the airline between, and including, six to 10 
years appeared to perceive managers as more committed to safety, and that 
managers actions were more favorable to promoting safety, than participants two 
had worked at the airline for less than a year did. It is possible that participants 
who had worked at the organization longer were older, more experienced hence 
had a clearer understanding of work-related risks, and perceive risk differently 
than those how had worked at the company for less than a year. This 
observation can also be explained by the lack of sufficient evidence to suggest 
that the length of time an employee had worked at employee’s current job, was a 
factor of perception of safety culture and safety climate, and that age was a 
factor of the same. Adjekum et al. (2015) suggests that age is factor or safety 
reporting possibly due to perception of reportable risk. However, it is interesting, 
that with the current study, regarding perceived employee involvement in safety, 
the difference is between adjacent age groups 41-50 and 51-60. It is possible 
that this observation is purely coincidental, related to statistically significant 
different responses based on job category such as maintenance and flight 
attendant, or yet, subject to other confounding factors otherwise not addressed in 








5.3 Limitations   
The current study experienced a number of limitations. The sample size for 
the online survey (n = 71) was lower than the researcher had anticipated 
(approximately n = 200). Equally, some sub-groups of the study, such as senior 
management, received low or zero representation on the survey segment of the 
current study. According to Newey and McFadden (1994), sample size can affect 
type I error. To limit the effect of a smaller sample size, the current study 
employed the Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric H test where applicable. While the 
smaller sample size also limits the generalizability of the current findings, the 
results provide valuable information to the researcher, the subject airline, aviation 
safety stakeholders, and other researchers.   
A second limitation of the current study was the use of one focus group 
session. The researcher had originally designed to hold two focus group activities, 
one comprising front line employee, the other, the management team. Financial, 
operational, and organizational changes that took place in the subject airline 
within the period of the current study created a challenging environment to hold a 
frontline-employee focus group activity.   
Participation from the group Dispatch was relatively low, which affected the 
assessment of the group in this study. Participation to the current study was 
anonymous and confidential. As such, the researcher was limited regarding 









Data from the current investigation assessed the relevant research 
questions, but also raised new areas of potential interest. 
5.4.1 Recommendations for Practice 
Limitations of the current study restrict generalizability of the study findings. 
Nevertheless, the findings can still provide some insight into the dynamics of 
airline safety environment as well as important lessons. Based on the current 
study’s findings, strategic planning in an organization’s expansion, operationally 
or geographically, should include measures that ensure a sustained and efficient 
communication standard across all employee hierarchies, to a level that 
maintains a positive safety environment. 
The current study indicated that just culture; perceived risk; and effective 
and timely feedback regarding incidents reported; were among the vital factors to 
reporting culture. These values and elements should be constantly nurtured. 
Nevertheless, where these elements are in play, effective employee education as 
it pertains to new and existing safety reporting programs, as well as appropriate 
motivation and interventions to use these programs, are vital measures to 
promote an effective safety reporting culture. A case in point was the role that 
just culture, employee education, and valuable feedback appeared to have in 
rapidly building trust and acceptance of the ASAP program among flight 
attendants. New programs need constant reevaluation and necessary changes 
effected, as appears to be the case for pilots’ experience pertaining to the fatigue 








As safety culture and safety climate are dynamic (Taylor, 2012), as well as 
due to limitations associated with qualitative and cross-sectional studies 
(Creswell, 2009) safety culture and safety climate studies should be conducted 
as frequently as practical. Specific issue suggested by participants, particularly 
those that appear critical and not substantiated by the researcher or participants 
such as cited routine violations, be investigated further, accordingly, by the study 
subject organizations.  
5.4.2 Recommendation for future Research  
The researcher of the current study recommends the following items for 
future research. The current study is cross-sectional in design. One of the 
limitations of a cross-sectional study is that it provides only a snapshot of a 
situation in time (Creswell, 2009). A longitudinal design study would allow for 
investigating trends and would provide relevant consistent mitigations that may 
be particularly important and in tandem with the dynamic nature of organizational 
culture.   
The researcher of the current study recommends future work to include at 
least three focus groups that target each of the group segments, frontline 
employees, middle-level managers, and executive/senior managers. This 
approach would promote equal representation of all hierarchies and may gather 
comprehensive data related to the study for more accurate analyses.  
While the present study identified many variables of safety climate and 








psychological variables. An example of a positive psychological variable of safety 
reporting identified by the current study was the inherent desire by some 
participants to provide information useful to other employees and the 
organization. However, of particular concern to the researcher of the current 
study were two behaviors. The first pertains to the fear, among some flight 
attendants, of receiving negative feedback from passengers or “getting in trouble”, 
which prompted them to keep serving passengers through occurrences of 
turbulence, this, despite the assurance of support from the subject airline’s 
management. Similarly, some responses suggested that maintenance 
technicians, among other motivation of a negative safety culture and climate, was 
the strong sense of owing the passenger a timely flight.        
5.5 Conclusions   
Safety is vital in the aviation industry. Airlines are expected to implement 
SMS by the year 2018 (FAA, 2015b). The success of the SMS, a comprehensive 
safety management program that allows for a positive safety standing in an 
organization (GAO, 2012; ICAO, 2009) is highly reliant on the prevailing 
organizational safety environment (FAA, 2015). Safety climate allows for the 
capture of employee “…attitudes, opinions and feelings towards safety, and its 
management within the organization” (HSE, 2005, p. 16). Knowledge about 
employee perception of SMS, safety culture, and safety climate, is essential in 
establishing a sustained safe operational environment. The current study 








  Research finding suggests no significant differences among respondents 
regarding safety culture, but that, flight attendants perceive Just and Learning 
cultures more positively that maintenance technicians, when the studied groups 
were compared, as well as management’s commitment to safety. Additionally, 
time participants had worked at the subject airline appeared to be a variable in 
perception of safety climate.  
The findings also suggests that employees perceived the ASAP safety 
program very positively and had an optimistic view of safety at the subject airline. 
Limitations of this study included small sample sizes for survey participants and 
the inability to conduct a frontline-employee focus group activity.  
Among the researcher’s recommendations for application and for future 
research included better promotion and evaluation of safety programs; 
investigation of psychological variables of safety behavior; and suggested 
carrying out longitudinal studies. Additionally, the researcher recommended 
further investigation into all allegations of routine violations identified in such 















LIST OF REFERENCES 
Aaron, L. (2012). Survey research. Radtech, 8(2), 190-192 
 
Adjekum, D.  K., Keller, J., Walala, M., Young, J.  P., Christensen, C., DeMik, R.  
J., Northam, G. (2015).  Cross-sectional assessment of safety culture 
perceptions and safety behavior in collegiate aviation programs in the 
United States.  International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and 
Aerospace, 2(4). http://dx.doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2015.1074 
 
Australia Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA). (2005). Guidance for preparing a 
safety management system (SMS) (No.: AC 172-01(0)).  
 
Ayres, M., Shirazi, H., Cardoso, S., Brown, J., Speir, R., Seleznava, O., Hall, J., 
& Ryan, T., (2009). Safety Management Systems for airports (ACRP 
Report 1 Vol. 2,). Transportation Research Board.  
 
Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action: A social-cognitive 
theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.  
 
Berg, B. L., & Lune, H. (2004). Qualitative research methods for the social 
sciences (3rd. ed.). MA: Pearson. 
 
Bird, F.E., & Germain, G.L. (1996). Practical loss control leadership. Loganville, 
GA: Det Norske Verita.  
 
Brown, K. A., Willis, P. G., & Prussia, G. E. (2000). Predicting safe employee 
behavior in the steel industry: Development and test of a sociotechnical 
model. Journal of Operations Management, 18(4), 445-465.  
 
Canella, G. S., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2011). Ethics, research regulations, and critical 
social science. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), The Sage 
Handbook of Qualitative Research (4th ed., pp. 81–89). Thousand Oaks, 








Chen, C. F., & Chen, S. C. (2011). Perception gaps in the execution of safety 
management system-a case study of the airline industry. Proceedings of 
the Eastern Asia Society for Transportation Studies, 2011, (0), (pp. 344-
344).  
 
Chen, C. F., & Chen, S. C. (2012). Scale development of safety management 
system evaluation for the airline industry. Accident Analysis & 
Prevention, 47, 177-181. doi:10.1016/j.aap.2012.01.012 
 
Clarke, S. (1999). Perceptions of organizational safety: implications for the 




Creswell, J. W. (2009). Research design: qualitative, quantitative, and mixed 
method approaches (3rd. ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publication Inc. 
 
Cooper, M. D. (2000). Towards a model of safety culture. Safety Science, 36(2), 
111–136. doi: 10.1016/S0925-7535(00)00035-7  
 
Cox, S., & Cox, T. (1991). The structure of employee attitudes to safety: A 
European example. Work & stress, 5(2), 93-106. doi: 
10.1080/02678379108257007 
 




Cullen, W. D., & Cullen, L. (2001). The Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry: Part 2; 
Report. HSE Books.  
 
Damianakis, T., & Woodford, M. R. (2012). Qualitative research with small 
connected communities generating new knowledge while upholding 
research ethics. Qualitative Health Research, 22, 708–718. 
doi:10.1177/1049732311431444  
 
Dattalo, P. (2008). Determining sample size: Balancing power, precision, and 
practicality. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
DoD, U. S. (2000). MIL-STD-882D Standard Practice for System Safety Program 
Requirement. Retrieved from http://www.system-
safety.org/Documents/MIL-STD-882E.pdf 
 
Ericson, C. A. (2005). Hazard analysis techniques for system safety. 








Federal Aviation Administration. (2002). Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP). 




Federal Aviation Administration. (2008). Safety management system guidelines: 




Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (2012). Safety risk management policy 
(Order 8040.4A). Retrieved from 
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/8040.4A%20.pdf  
 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (2013). Air Traffic Organization 2013 




Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (2014). Air Traffic Organization 2014 




Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (2015, January 6). Safety Management 
System SMS explained. Retrieved from 
https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/sms/explained/ 
 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (2015b). FAA final rule requires Safety 
Management System for airlines [press release].Retrieved from 
https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=18094 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (n.d.). System safety process. Retrieved from 
https://www.faasafety.gov/gslac/alc/libview_normal.aspx?id=6877 
 
Field, A. (2009). Discovering statistics using SPSS. London: Sage. 
 
Fleiss, J. L., Levin, B., & Paik, M. C. (2013). Statistical methods for rates and 
proportions (3rd ed.). New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.  
 
Flin, R., Mearns, K., O’Connor, P., and Bryden, R. (2000). Measuring safety 










Gao, Y., Bruce, P. J., Newman, D. G., & Zhang, C. B. (2013). Safety climate of 
commercial pilots: The effect of pilot ranks and employment experiences. 
Journal of Air Transport Management, 30, 17-24. 
doi:10.1016/j.jairtraman.2013.04.001 
 
Gao, Y., Bruce, P. J., & Rajendran, N. (2015). Safety climate of a commercial 
airline: A cross-sectional comparison of four occupational groups. Journal 
of Air Transport Management, 47, 162-171. 
doi:10.1016/j.jairtraman.2015.05.010 
 
GAIN Working Group E. (2004). A roadmap to a just culture: enhancing the 
safety environment. Retried from http://flightsafety.org/files/just_culture.pdf 
 
Geller, E. S. (1994). Ten principles for achieving a total safety culture. 
Professional Safety, 39(9), 18. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/200347593?accountid=13360 
 
Gerede, E. (2015). A study of challenges to the success of the safety 
management system in aircraft maintenance organizations in 
Turkey. Safety Science, 73, 106-116. doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2014.11.013 
 
Gibbons, A. M., von Thaden, T. L., & Wiegmann, D. A. (2006). Development and 
initial validation of a survey for assessing safety culture within commercial 
flight operations. The international journal of Aviation Psychology, 16(2), 
215-238. doi: 10.1207/s15327108ijap1602_6 
 
Gill, G. K., & Shergill, G. S. (2004). Perceptions of safety management and 
safety culture in the aviation industry in New Zealand. Journal of Air 
Transport Management, 10(4), 231-237. 
doi:10.1016/j.jairtraman.2004.02.002 
 
Grady, J. O. (2014). System requirement analysis. Elsevier. doi:10.1016/B978-0-
12-417107-7.00001-4 
 
Harris, D. (2011). Human performance on the flight deck. Surrey, England: 
Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.  
 
Harrison, J., & Rooney, D. (2012). Knowledge and its integrity within a 
knowledge economy: Ethics and wise social research. Teoksessa Love, 
K.(toim.) Studies in Qualitative Methodology, 12, 27-50. 
 
Harvey, N., & Holmes, C. A. (2012). Nominal group technique: an effective 
method for obtaining group consensus. International journal of nursing 








Health and Safety Executive. (HSE). (2005). A review of the safety culture and 
safety climate literature for the development of the safety culture 
inspection toolkit (Research report 365): Retrieved from 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrpdf/rr367.pdf 
 
Hecker, S., & Goldenhar, L. (2014). Understanding safety culture and safety 
climate in construction: Existing evidence and a path forward. Silver 
Spring, MD: CPWR—The Center for Construction Research and Training.  
 
Heinrich, H. W. (1959). Industrial accident prevention: A scientific approach. New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Helmreich, R. L., & Merritt, A. R. (2001). Culture at work in aviation and medicine: 
National, organizational and professional influences: Ashgate  
 
Hennink, M. M. (2014). Focus group discussion. Understanding qualitative 
research. Oxford: Oxford University Press  
 
Hodges, N. (2011). Qualitative research: A discussion of frequently articulated 
qualms (FAQs). Family and Consumer Sciences Research Journal, 40, 
90–92. doi:10.1111/j.1552-3934.2011.02091.x 
 
Hudson, P. T. W. (2001a). Safety management and safety culture: the long, hard 
and winding road. Occupational health and safety management systems, 




Hudson, P. (2001b). Safety Culture-Theory and practice: Leiden University 
(Netherlands) Centre for Safety Science. 
 
Hudson, P. (2007). Implementing a safety culture in a major multi-national. 
Safety Science, 45(6), 697-722. doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2007.04.005 
 
International Air Transport Association. (2011). Safety Management Systems: 
Implementation and controls handbook. Montreal, Canada: IATA Training 
and Development Institute. 
 
International Association of Oil & Gas Producers. (2013). Shaping safety culture 
through safety leadership (OGP Report No. 452). London: OGP.  
 
International Civil Aviation Organization. (2009). Safety management manual 
(SMM) (Doc.9859 [2nd ed.]) Montréal, Canada: International Civil Aviation 









International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) (2013). Safety Management 
Manual (Doc 9859 AN/474) third ed., Montreal  
 
Johnson, W. B., Mason, F., Hall, S., & Watson, J. (2001). Evaluation of aviation 
maintenance working environments, fatigue, and human performance. 
Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration.  
 
Joshi, A., Kale, S., Chandel, S., & Pal, D. K. (2015). Likert scale: explored and 
explained. British Journal of Applied Science & Technology, 7(4), 396. 
 
Kamberelis, G., & Dimitriadis, G. (2005). Focus groups. The Sage Handbook of 
Qualitative Research-Third Edition. Sage Publications, 20020, 887-908. 
 
Krueger, R. & Casey, M. (2000). Focus groups: A practical guide for applied 
research (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.  
 
Landry, S. J. (Ed.). (2012). Advances in Human Aspects of Aviation: Boca Raton, 
FL: CRC Press.  
 
Lee, T., 1998. Assessment of safety culture at a nuclear reprocessing plant. 
Work and Stress, 12 (3), 217–237  
 
Lewis, (2008). A brief overview of Safety Management Systems (SMS). Flight 
safety Information Journal, January, 2008 
 
Liou, J. J., Tzeng, G. H., & Chang, H. C. (2007). Airline safety measurement 
using a hybrid model. Journal of Air Transport Management, 13(4), 243-
249. 
Liou, J. J., Yen, L., & Tzeng, G. H. (2008). Building an effective safety 
management system for airlines. Journal of Air Transport 
Management, 14(1), 20-26. 
 
Macrae, C. (2009). Making risks visible: Identifying and interpreting threats to 
airline flight safety. Journal of Occupational and Organizational 
Psychology, 82(2), 273-293. 
 
Manuele, F. A. (2013). On the practice of safety. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Maurino, D. E. (2007). Safety in perspective. ICAO Journal, 62(5). 
 
May, P. J., (2010). Performance-based regulation. Jerusalem Papers in 









McDonald, N., Corrigan, S., Daly, C., & Cromie, S. (2000). Safety management 
systems and safety culture in aircraft maintenance organisations. Safety 
Science, 34(1), 151-176.  
 
Miles, M. B., Huberman, A. M., & Saldaña, J. (2013). Qualitative data analysis: A 
methods sourcebook. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Mitchell, K., Sholy, B., & Stolzer, A. J. (2007). General aviation aircraft flight 
operations quality assurance: overcoming the obstacles. Aerospace and 
Electronic Systems Magazine, IEEE, 22(6), 9-15. 
 
Nakagawa, S., & Cuthill, I. C. (2007). Effect size, confidence interval and 
statistical significance: a practical guide for biologists. Biological 
Reviews,82(4), 591-605.  
 
Natinal Aeronautics and Space Administation (2003). Report of the Columbia 
Accidents Investigation Board, NASA, Houston.  
 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (2015). Aviation safety reporting 
system. Retrieved from http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/overview/immunity.html 
 
Newey, W. K., & McFadden, D. (1994). Large sample estimation and hypothesis 
testing. Handbook of econometrics, 4, 2111-2245. Variables  
 
Nieva, V. F., & Sorra, J. (2003). Safety culture assessment: a tool for improving 
patient safety in healthcare organizations. Quality and Safety in Health 
Care, 12(suppl 2), ii17-ii23. doi:10.1136/qhc.12.suppl_2.ii17 
 
Noether, G. E. (2012). Introduction to statistics: the nonparametric way. Springer 
Science & Business Media.  
 
Parker, D., Lawrie, M., & Hudson, P. (2006). A framework for understanding the 
development of organisational safety culture. Safety Science, 44(6), 551-
562. 
 
Patankar, M. S., Brown, J. P., Subin, E. J., & Bigda-Peyton. (2012). Safety 
culture: building and sustaining a cultural change in aviation and 
healthcare. England: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. 
 
Patankar, M. S. & Sabin, E. (2010). The safety culture perspective. In E. Salas 
and D. Maurino (eds), Human Factors in Aviation, second edition. Chennai: 









Pearse, W., Gallagher, C., & Bluff, L. (Eds.). (2001). Occupational health & safety 
management systems. Proceedings of the first national conference, 
Crown Content. WorkCover. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/WLdr5y 
 
Reason, J. T., (1997). Managing the risks of organizational accidents (Vol. 6). 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
 
Reason, J. (1998). Achieving a safe culture: theory and practice. Work and 
Stress, 12 (3), 293–306.  
 
Reason, J,. (2000). Safety paradoxes and safety culture. Journal of injury control 
and safety promotion, 7 (2000), pp. 3–14 
 
Rose, A. (2006). Measuring operational safety in aviation. Aircraft Engineering 
and Aerospace Technology, 78(1), 26-31. 
 
Rousseau, D. M. (1990). Assessing organizational culture: The case for multiple 
methods. In B. Schneider (Ed.), Organizational climate and culture (pp. 
153–192). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Salkind, N. J. (2009). Exploring research. Upper Daddler River: Pearson 
 
Seo, D. C., Torabi, M. R., Blair, E. H., & Ellis, N. T. (2004). A cross-validation of 
safety climate scale using confirmatory factor analytic approach. Journal 
of safety research, 35(4), 427-445.  
 
Shappell, S. A. (2006). Human error and commercial aviation accidents: A 
comprehensive, fine-grained analysis using HFACS (DOT/FAA/AM-06/81). 
Washington DC: Federal Aviation Administration 
 
Shappell, S. A., & Wiegmann, D. A. (2000). The Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System – HFACS (DOT/FAA/AM-00/7). Virginia: Federal 
Aviation Administration.  
 
Silverman D. (2011). Interpreting qualitative data (4th ed.). London: Sage 
 
Stevens, J. P. (2002). Applied multivariate statistics for the social sciences (4th 
ed.). New Jersey: Routledge. 
 
Stolzer, A. J., Halford, C. D., & Goglia, J. J. (2008). Safety management systems 












Stolzer, A. J., Halford, C. D., & Goglia, J. J. (Eds.). (2011). Implementing safety 
management systems in aviation. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. 
 
Taylor, J. B. (2012). Safety culture: assessing and changing the behaviour of 
organisations. Farnham England: Gower Publishing, Ltd. 
 
Thomson, J. R. (2015). High Integrity Systems and Safety Management in 
Hazardous Industries. Butterworth-Heinemann.  
 
Transport Canada, 2008. Guidance on Safety Management Systems 
Development. No.: AC 107-001: Transport Canada 
  
Trochim, M. K. W., (2006). Deduction and induction. Retrieved from 
http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/dedind.php 
 
Tsay, C. Y. J., Kuo, C. C., Chao, C. J., Drury, C. G., & Hsiao, Y. L. (2014). Safety 
culture evaluation in China Airlines: a preliminary study. In Engineering 
Psychology and Cognitive Ergonomics (pp. 387-397). Springer 
International Publishing.  
 
Tolk, J. N., Cantu, J., & Beruvides, M. (2015). High Reliability Organization 
Research: A Literature Review for Health Care. Engineering Management 
Journal, 27(4), 218-237. 
 
United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority (UKCAA). (2010). Safety Management 
Systems– Guidance to organizations, version 3.  
 
U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO]. (2014). Aviation safety. Additional 
oversight planning by FAA could enhance safety risk management (GAO-
14-516). Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664402.pdf 
 
Varjavand, N., Bachegowda, L. S., Gracely, E., & Novack, D. H. (2012). Changes 
in intern attitudes toward medical error and disclosure. Medical education, 
46(7), 668-677. doi: 10.1111/j.1365-2923.2012.04269.x  
 
Vick, S. (2002), Degrees of belief: subjective probability and engineering 
judgment, Reston, VA: ASCE Press. 
 
von Thaden, T. L., Wiegmann, D. A., Mitchell, A. A., Sharma, G., & Zhang, H. 
(2003). Safety culture in a regional airline: Results from a commercial 
aviation safety survey. In 12th International Symposium on Aviation 









Wakita, T., Ueshima, N., & Noguchi, H. (2012). Psychological distance between 
categories in the Likert scale comparing different numbers of 
options. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 72(4), 533-546. 
 
Westrum, R. (1993) Cultures with requisite imagination. In J. A. Wise, P. Stager 
& J. Hopkin (Eds.) Verification and Validation in Complex Systems. 
Human Factors Issues.  Verlag, Berlin: Springer  
 
Wilke, S. (2013). Modelling airport surface safety: a framework for a holistic 
airport safety management (Doctoral dissertation, Imperial College 
London). Retrieved from 
https://spiral.imperial.ac.uk/handle/10044/1/24838 
 
Wreathall, J. (1995). Organizational culture, behavior norms, and safety. In A. 
Carnino & G. Weimann (Eds.), Proceedings of the International Topical 
Meeting on Safety Culture in Nuclear Installations (pp. 24–28). Vienna, 
Austria. 
 
Wood, R. H. (2003). Aviation safety programs: A management handbook (3rd 
ed.). Englewood, CO: Jeppesen Sanderson.  
  
Wood, R., & Bandura, A. (1989). Social cognitive theory of organizational 
management. Academy of management Review, 14(3), 361-384. doi: 
10.5465/AMR.1989.4279067 
  
Yule, S. (2003). Senior management influence on safety performance in the UK 




Zohar, D. (1980). Safety climate in industrial organizations: theoretical and 
applied implications. Journal of applied psychology, 65(1), 96. 
 
Zohar, D. (2000). A group-level model of safety climate: testing the effect of 
group climate on microaccidents in manufacturing jobs. Journal of applied 
psychology, 85(4), 587.  
 
Zohar, D. (2014). Safety Climate: Conceptualization, Measurement, and 



















RESEARCH PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
Perception of Safety Culture at a Regional Airline 
Dr. Richard Fanjoy - Principal Investigator 
Mr. Micah Walala – Co-investigator 
School of Aviation and Transportation Technology 
Purdue University 
 
Your opinion about the safety climate at “deleted” is important in the continual 
improvement of safety in the aviation industry. The purpose of this study is to 
attempt to assess the perception of front line operational personnel such as pilots, 
dispatch, and maintenance personnel, as well as management’s opinion of the 
status of the safety culture at a regional airline. Understanding safety perceptions 
will assist regional airlines in making continuous safety improvements to all 
aspects of its operations. My name is Micah Walala, a student from Purdue 
University in the School of Aviation and Transportation Technology, working 
closely with Dr. Richard Fanjoy, the Principal Investigator. You are eligible to 




participate in this study because you are an employee of “deleted” [subject airline] 
or its subsidiary, and are at least 18 years old.  
 
Since answers are to remain anonymous, PLEASE DO NOT PUT YOUR NAME 
ON THIS SURVEY.  Results will be reported for the group of respondents as a 
whole to further ensure your anonymity. Furthermore, only the investigators will 
have access to the survey data. “Deleted” [subject airline] will be furnished with 
the final report that will not contain any personal identifiable data.  
 
If you decide to participate in this study, you will take part in one, two, or three of 
the following study phases: survey, interview, and focus group activities. The 
questions in all three phases are designed to determine how you perceive the 
safety culture in your organization. 
 
Survey: - You are asked to answer a short questionnaire of 20 questions with five 
point Likert-scale about your perception of aviation safety culture in your 
organization. The survey includes one open-ended essay style question. The 
survey will take approximately 10 minutes, and will be conducted on-line with a 
title ‘Safety Culture Survey’. The survey also asks you to identify some of your 
demographic information such as age and length of time you have worked at 





Interview: - You are asked a set of questions about your perception of safety 
culture in your organization. The interview is designed to last for approximately 
30 minutes. With your permission, the interview will be audio recorded. The 
recording is only for purpose of the research. Only Dr. Fanjoy and I will listen to 
the recording.  
 
Focus group activity: - A set of questions and topic will be introduced for your 
opinion and discussion. With your permission, the session will be audio recorded. 
The recording is only for purpose of the research. Only Dr. Fanjoy and I will listen 
to the recording. The focus group session will last for approximately 30 minutes.  
 
Risks are minimal for involvement in this study. However, you may feel 
emotionally uneasy when asked to make judgments based on your perception of 
some safety issues affecting aviation safety at your organization. You may omit 
questions that you feel uncomfortable to answer.  
  
Your participation in this study is voluntary. Your may choose not to participate or 
stop participating at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are 
otherwise entitled. Your opinions and comments are confidential and will be 
aggregated in the analysis. 
 
If you will have any questions, comments, or concerns about this research 




Mr. Walala at mwalala@purdue.edu. You may also contact Purdue’s Human 
Research Protection Program at 767-494-5942, irb@purdue.edu, or write to: 
Human Research Protection Program - Purdue University  
Ernest C. Young Hall, Room 1032  
155 S. Grant St.,  











Appendix B Intranet and Electronic Recruitment Statement 
 
Safety Culture Study 
Your opinion about the safety climate at “deleted” [subject airline] is important in 
the continual improvement of safety in the aviation industry. My name is Micah 
Walala, a graduate researcher working closely with Dr. Richard Fanjoy, a faculty 
member at Purdue University in the School of Aviation and Transportation 
Technology, invite you to participate in an anonymous survey about perceptions 
of the safety culture at “deleted” [subject airline]. Understanding safety 
perceptions will assist “deleted” [subject airline] in making continuous 
improvements in safety to all aspects of its operations. You must be 18 years or 
older to participate. The survey is voluntary.  You may stop participating at any 
time without consequence.  
Since answers are to remain anonymous, PLEASE DO NOT PUT YOUR NAME 
ON THIS SURVEY.  Results will be reported for the group of respondents as a 
whole to further ensure your anonymity. To further protect your identity, only the 
investigators will have access to the survey data. “deleted” [subject airline] will be 
furnished with the final report that will not contain any personal identifiable 
information.  
The survey will take approximately 10 minutes. Please answer questions to your 
comfort level. To participate in the survey, click on the link below. Your consent is 




If you have any questions or concerns, feel free to contact Dr. Fanjoy at 
rofanjoy@purdue.edu, 765 494 7764 or Mr. Walala at mwalala@purdue.edu, 765 
714 9084  
Again, we very much appreciate your assistance in this research effort.  






Appendix C Focus Group Script  
 
Hello and welcome to this focus group session intended to assess the safety climate at 
“deleted” [subject airline]. My name is Micah Walala, a graduate researcher working 
closely with Dr. Richard Fanjoy, a faculty member at Purdue University in the School of 
Aviation and Transportation Technology. I will conduct the discussion and take notes. 
Your opinion of safety climate at “deleted” [subject airline] is important to improving 
aviation operational safety. I invited you all to share and discuss your perceptions of 
safety at this organization. I will ask you several open questions. Your personal opinions 
and view are very important to the study as well as to the continuous improvement of 
safety in the aviation industry.  
There are no right or wrong answers. Please feel welcome to express yourself freely 
during the discussion. This conversation will be digitally audio recorded. The recording is 
only for purpose of the research. Only Dr. Fanjoy and I will listen to the recording. Your 
opinions and comments are confidential and will be aggregated in the analysis. No names 
or personal information will be used in the report. However, due to the context of group 
research, researchers cannot guarantee confidentiality as investigators cannot control 
what individuals say outside the research context. Participation is also voluntary. You 
may stop participating in the discussion at any time without consequence.  
The discussion will last for about one hour. I ask you to please switch off your mobile 
phones. Please give everyone the chance to express his or her opinion during the 




to assist in the discussion. Is everything clear about the course of the focus group 
discussion? 
If you will have any questions or concerns later, feel free to contact me at 





Appendix D Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
 
Safety Culture and Safety Climate Semi-structured Interview 
Questions.  
You identify yourself as: Front-line employee__   Supervisor or Middle-
level manager__ Senior Manager__  
1. How long have you been with “deleted” [subject airline] and what are your 
roles and responsibilities? 
2.  What aspects of the “deleted”’s [subject airline] safety program are you 
familiar with? 
3.  Do you have interaction with the “deleted” [subject airline] safety 
personnel? 
4.  
a. How is safety emphasized in your work area with the employees 
you supervise? (for managers only) 
b. How is safety emphasized in your work area? (for front line 
employees only) 
5.  
a. Is information about “deleted”’s [subject airline] safety programs 
available to you and if so, how is it disseminated to your employees? 
(for managers only) 
b. Is information on the “deleted” [subject airline] safety programs 
available to your front-line employees and if so, how is it 
disseminated to them. (for front line employees only) 
6. On a scale of 1 to 5, 5 being the highest, what is your general opinion of 
the safety climate at this organization? 
7. What areas of the organization do you feel are the strongest from a safety 
standpoint? 
8. What areas of the organization do you feel need to further emphasize 
safety?  
9. What are your recommendations, if any, for improving safety at “deleted” 
[subject airline]?  










RESEARCH PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
Perception of Safety Culture at a Regional Airline 
Dr. Richard Fanjoy - Principal Investigator 
Mr. Micah Walala – Co-investigator 
School of Aviation and Transportation Technology 
Purdue University 
 
“deleted” [subject airline] values, and is interested in your opinion concerning its 
safety culture. The purpose of this study is to attempt to assess the perception of 
front line operational personnel such as pilots, dispatch, and maintenance 
personnel, as well as management’s opinion of the status of the safety culture at 
“deleted” [subject airline]. Understanding safety perceptions will assist “deleted” 
[subject airline] in making continuous improvements in safety to all aspects of its 
operations. My name is Micah Walala, a student from Purdue University in the 
School of Aviation and Transportation Technology, working closely with Dr. 
Richard Fanjoy, the Principal Investigator. You are eligible to participate in this 




study because you are an employee of “deleted” [subject airline] or its affiliate, 
and are at least 18 years old.  
 
If you decide to participate in this study, you will take part in one, two, or three of 
the following study phases: survey, interview, and focus group activities. The 
questions in all three phases are designed to determine how you perceive the 
safety culture in your organization. 
 
Survey: - You are asked to answer a short questionnaire of 20 questions with five 
point Likert-scale about your perception of aviation safety culture in your 
organization. The survey includes one open-ended essay style question. The 
survey will take approximately 10 minutes, and will be conducted on-line with a 
title ‘Safety Culture Survey’. The survey also asks you to identify some of your 
demographic information such as age and length of time you have worked at 
your current position.  
 
Interview: - You are asked a set of questions about your perception of safety 
culture in your organization. The interview is designed to last for approximately 
30 minutes. With your permission, the interview will be audio recorded. The 
recording is only for purpose of the research. Only Dr. Fanjoy and I will listen to 





Focus group activity: - A set of questions and topic will be introduced for your 
opinion and discussion. With your permission, the session will be audio recorded. 
The recording is only for purpose of the research. Only Dr. Fanjoy and I will listen 
to the recording. The focus group session will last for approximately 30 minutes.  
 
Risks are minimal for involvement in this study. However, you may feel 
emotionally uneasy when asked to make judgments based on your perception of 
some safety issues affecting aviation safety at your organization. You may omit 
questions that you feel uncomfortable to answer. Although we do not expect any 
harm to come upon any participants due to electronic malfunction of the 
computer during the survey session, it is possible though extremely rare and 
uncommon 
 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. Your may choose not to 
participate or stop participating at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to 
which you are otherwise entitled. Your opinions and comments are confidential 
and will be aggregated in the analysis. 
 
If you will have any questions, comments, or concerns about this research 
project, feel free to contact Dr. Fanjoy at rofanjoy@purdue.edu, 765 494 7764 or 
Mr. Walala at mwalala@purdue.edu. You may also contact Purdue’s Human 
Research Protection Program at 767-494-5942, irb@purdue.edu, or write to: 




Ernest C. Young Hall, Room 1032  
155 S. Grant St.,  
West Lafayette, IN 47907-2114  
 
Documentation of Informed Consent 
 
I have had the opportunity to read this consent form and have the research study 
explained.  I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the research study, 
and my questions have been answered.  I am prepared to participate in the 
research study described above.  I will be offered a copy of this consent form after 
I sign it.   
 
__________________________________________                           
_________________________ 
              Participant’s Signature                                                                                  
Date 
  
__________________________________________                           
              Participant’s Name 
 
__________________________________________                          
___________________________ 






Appendix F Focus Group Questions 
Assessment of Safety Culture Perceptions at a Regional Airline  
Focus Group Questions/Script  
INTRODUCTION  
Thank you for taking time out of your valuable schedule to participate in this 
focus group session. My name is Micah Walala. I’m a graduate student from 
Purdue University. I am working on my dissertation research, in which I am trying 
to assess perceptions of the safety climate and safety culture at “deleted” 
[subject company]. This is the last of a three-segment study. I have gathered and 
analyzed responses from online surveys and interviews. This meeting is about 
generating a discussion to educate my perceptions gathered so far from the two 
completed stages of the study. Please feel free to share your views and opinions.  
GENERAL PERCEPTION OF WORK ENVIRONMENT  
First, I would like to know a little more about your work areas.  
1. To get started, what do you find most challenging about your work, and how do 
those challenges influence safety culture?  
SAFETY REPORTING AND JUST CULTURE 
Safety reporting; the aviation industry is increasingly relying on incident reporting 
to improve aviation safety.  
2. What do you consider as the most effective safety programs, and why? 
3. Data appears to indicate safety reporting has been steady among pilots, 
increasingly picking up among flight attendants, and still very low among 
maintenance technicians? What do you think accounts for these differences?  
 
FEEDBACK  
Feedback from incidents can be very helpful in preventing future accidents  
4. Opinions regarding receiving feedback from incidents from programs such as 
ASAP, Incident Reporting, Safety hotline, and Ghost rider programs varied 
greatly among participants. Why do you think that is the case?  
  
LEARNING CULTURE  
A learning culture organization is characterized by two elements, an 
organization’s ability to lean about its safety concerns, and its ability to implement 
necessary changes.  
5. There seemed to be extreme conflicting views regarding the company’s 
commitment to implant safety changes, what have been your personal 
experiences? 
MANAGEMENT‘S ROLE IS SAFETY  
Now, let us discuss management’s role in safety.  
6. Responses from participants suggest that senior managers are largely out of 
touch from front-line employees and the safety department. If so, what safety 








Let us talk about organizations. The nature of relationships between departments 
in an organization can influence prevailing safety standing.  
8. How would you describe the relationship between employees of the various 
divisions in the company, and the impact of those relationships to safety?  
Fatigue Management Program  
The fatigue management program is intended to improve operational safety. 
9. What are some of the challenges of the fatigue management program and how 
are both pilots and management coping with these challenges?  
SUMMARY & CLOSING  
All right, just three more questions. 
10. What are the things you are most proud regarding safety culture at “deleted” 
[subject airline]? 
11. What keeps you awake at night, in regard to safety?  
12. Are there any other general comments regarding safety that you would like to 
share? 
Thank you all for your time and for sharing valuable information. This is the last of 
a 3-segment study intended to assess the safety climate and safety culture at 
“deleted” [subject airline]. The final aggregated result will be available to the 
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